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Disability Human Rights
Michael Ashley Steint
Responding to the absence of an international treaty expressly
protecting people with disabilities, the United Nations General Assembly
will soon adopt a disability-based human rights convention. This Article
examines the theoretical implications of adding disability to the existing
canon of human rights, both for individuals with disabilities and for other
under-protected people. It develops a "disability human rights paradigm"
by combining components of the social model ofdisability, the human right
to development, and Martha Nussbaum's version of the capabilities
approach, but filters them through a disability rights perspective to
preserve that which provides for individual flourishing and modifying that
which does not. This Article maintains that Nussbaum's capabilities
approach provides an especially fertile space within which to understand
the content of human rights. However, because her scheme excludes some
intellectually disabled individuals and conditions the inclusion of others, it
falls short of a comprehensive framework. Amending Nussbaum's
capabilities approach to develop the talents of all individuals results in a
disability human rights paradigm that recognizes the dignity and worth of
every person. This Article also argues that a disability rights paradigm is
capable of fortifying human rights in two ways: first, it can reinforce
protections afforded to groups already protected, such as women; and
second, it can extend protections to people currently not protected, such as
sexual minorities and the poor. Ultimately, the disability rights paradigm
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indicates that human rights protection can progress from a group to an
individual basis. Repositioning disability as an inclusive concept embraces
disability as a universal human variation rather than an aberration.
INTRODUCTION

More than six hundred million people, or about 10% of the world's
population, have some type of disability.' Around 80% of disabled persons
live in developing countries, where they experience material deprivation
and social exclusion. 2 For example, only 2% of disabled children in such
countries receive any schooling. 3 Nevertheless, no existing United Nations
human rights treaty expressly protects people with disabilities. To claim
protection under a United Nations convention, disabled individuals must
either invoke a universal provision or embody a separately protected
characteristic. For instance, a woman with a disability may not claim
protection based on her disability status alone, but may claim protection
from torture or from sex discrimination.
As a result of these limitations, only a handful of disability-based
human rights claims have been asserted under these "hard laws." By
contrast, a series of General Assembly resolutions, declarations, and
protocols explicitly reference disability. Yet these "soft laws" are not
legally enforceable. Consequently, no existing international human rights
instrument is both applicable to and enforceable by individuals on the basis
of disability. In response to this void, the United Nations commissioned an
Ad Hoc Committee to consider an international convention specifically
protecting the human rights of disabled persons. As of this writing, that
committee has drafted articles for consideration by the General Assembly.
This Article examines the theoretical implications of adding disability
protections to the existing canon of human rights, both for individuals with
disabilities and for other under-protected people. 4 To do so, it develops a
"disability human rights paradigm" that combines components of the social
model of disability, the human right to development, and philosopher

1. GERARD QUINN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY 1 (2002), available at
http://www.nhri.net/pdf/disability.pdf.
2. See THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF USAID DISABILITY POLICY
1-2 (2000), http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABT610.pdf. For a sense of how the varying levels of
disability are reported from country to country, see Statistics Div., U.N. Dep't of Econs. &
Soc. Affairs, Human Functioning and Disability, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/
demographic/sconcems/disability/default.htrn (last visited Aug. 13, 2006).
3. See QuiNN ET AL., supra note I, at I.
4. Although the proposed convention is an expedient framework for discussing the
repercussions of incorporating disability-based rights into the extant body of human rights treaties, my'
arguments do not depend on its passage. At the same time, I freely admit that I favor enactment of the
proposed convention, and, moreover, that I am privileged to have been involved in its development.
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Martha Nussbaum's version of the "capabilities approach," 5 but filters
these frameworks through a disability rights perspective to preserve that
which provides for individual flourishing and modify that which does not.
Nussbaum's capabilities approach generally values the dignity,
autonomy, and potential of all individuals, and views each as his or her
own end. In doing so, her framework provides an elegant normative theory
of human rights as a means of ensuring human flourishing. However,
Nussbaum's scheme does not sufficiently account for the development of
individual talent. This is because it requires that individuals be capable of
attaining each of ten functional abilities as a prerequisite to being "truly
human" and thus wholly entitled to resource distribution. Consequently, her
framework excludes some individuals with intellectual disabilities, and only
indirectly assists others. 6
A more inclusive approach is the disability human rights paradigm,
which maintains as a moral imperative that every person is entitled to the
means necessary to develop and express his or her own individual talent.
This paradigm compels societies to acknowledge the value of all persons
based on inherent human worth, rather than basing value on an individual's
measured functional ability to contribute to society. Accordingly the
framework assesses ability from the bottom up, embracing all
individuals-including those excluded by Nussbaum's capabilities
approach-and accounting for their functional variations. By putting
potential talent above function, the paradigm I offer embraces disability as
a universal variation rather than as an aberration. This approach is
necessary if human rights are to apply to all humans.
This Article also argues that disability-based human rights necessarily
invoke both civil and political ("first-generation") rights, as well as
economic, social, and cultural ("second-generation") rights to a greater
degree than previous human rights paradigms. Broadly stated, firstgeneration rights largely occupy the focus of human rights practitioners
and advocates. These rights are understood as promoting equal treatment
among individuals, and include prohibitions against State interference.
5.
Strictly speaking, the capabilities approach originates with Amartya Sen's development
economics theories. See, e.g., AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS CAPABILITY EXPANSION, IN
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S I (Keith
Griffin & John Knight eds., 1990) (hereinafter SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS CAPABILITY EXPANSION]. The
premises proffered, by Nussbaum and Sen, respectively, provide essential support for arguments made
in this Article. In Parts III.B-C., I build on-and strongly critique-Nussbaum's version to help model
a framework for human rights because 1 find her feminist perspeetive conducive to disability rights
discourse. I utilize Sen's economic methodology primarily in Part IV.B. to argue in favor of extending
human rights protection to the poor because of its deeper link to development economics.
By logical extension Nussbaum's capabilities approach also excludes some individuals with
6.
non-intellectual disabilities as well as certain lower functioning individuals without disabilities. A full
diseussion exceeds the boundaries of this Article.
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Sometimes these rights are thought of as "negative rights." 7 Examples of
first-generation rights are the rights to life, movement, thought, expression,
association, religion, and political participation. 8 Second-generation rights
are traditionally the province of development agencies. These rights are
understood as providing equal opportunity, and are often thought of as
"positive rights." 9 Second-generation rights generally focus on standards of
living, including issues such as the availability of housing and education. 10
Tying first- and second-generation rights together illustrates how the
disability human rights paradigm can be applied to other people. The social
attitudes underlying disability-related exclusion manifest more overtly than
those causing isolation of other groups. Applying a disability paradigm
highlights the effect of social exclusion, and points out the need of
ensuring that the human rights of all socially marginalized groups are
protected. As a result, the disability human rights paradigm reaffirms that
established human rights protections, like those extending to women,
require indivisible application of first- and second-generation rights as
envisioned by the third-generation human right to development. The
disability framework also maintains that human rights protections should
be applied to other marginalized people, such as sexual minorities and the
poor. Ultimately, the disability rights paradigm indicates that human rights
protection can progress from a group to an individual basis. Thus, in
addition to advocating for disability-specific protection paralleling that of
established human rights instruments-itself a rare exercise in legal
literature 11 - l proffer an argument for extending disability-based human
7. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR EssAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 122 (1958)
(declaiming that authentic liberty is simply the absence of "the deliberate interference of other human
beings within the area in which I could otherwise act").
8. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 6,
para. I, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. N6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) ("Every human being has the
inherent right to life.") [hereinafter ICCPR]; ICCPR, supra, art. 9, para. I ("Everyone has the right to
liberty and security of person."); ICCPR, supra, art. 12, para. I ("Everyone lawfully within the territory
of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to ehoose his
residence."); ICCPR, supra, art. 18, para. I ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion.").
9. See, e.g., International Covenant on Eeonomic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), art. II, para. I, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. N6316, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (Dec. 16, 1966)
("States parties ... recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living") [hereinafter
ICESCR]; Berlin, supra note 7, at 123 (defining positive liberty as the result of self-reliance and the
ability to direct one's own agency).
10. It is significant that development agencies have only more recently embraced first-generation
rights. Human rights scholars have long criticized these entities for neglecting human rights to focus
exclusively on subsistence issues, meaning food and clean water. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The Fortieth
Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD
I, 11-12 (J. Bcrting eta!. eds., 1990).
II. A notable exception is THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL (Stanley S. Herr eta!. eds., 2003) (publishing the proceedings of
a 1995 conference convened at Yale Law School) [hereinafter DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL!.
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rights concepts to other socially excluded individuals. 12 The paradigm
therefore stakes out a distinct perspective on human rights law, one I hope
will encourage further discussion.
Parts 1 and II set forth the existing canon of disability-based human
rights protections. Part I considers current United Nations instruments
pertaining to disability, and briefly recounts the efforts underway to pass a
convention on behalf of disabled persons. Part II describes the social model
of disability in contrast to the medical model, and discusses its growing
influence on the formation of international instruments as well as its
limitations in overall human rights discourse. Parts III and IV consider the
implications of applying a disability human rights paradigm both to
persons with disabilities and other groups. Part III develops the paradigm
by integrating Martha Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach
with the social model of disability and the human right to development.
Part IV argues that the clearly indivisible nature of disability-based rights
presents a strong exemplar, indicating the ability to understand established
human rights as similarly undividable, and creates the possibility for
extending human rights protection to other vulnerable populations. This
Article concludes with a few thoughts on the potential consequences of
viewing disability as universal to rather than abnormal from the human
condition.
I
THE SCOPE OF DISABILITY HUMAN RIGHTS

Each of the seven core United Nations treaties theoretically applies to
disabled persons in varying degrees, but are rarely applied in practice.
Compounding this problem, General Assembly soft laws explicitly
referencing disability are legally unenforceable. An international
convention specifically protecting the human rights of disabled persons
will soon be considered by the General Assembly.

A.

Hard Laws: United Nations Core Treaties

Since its formation after the Second World War, the United Nations
has promulgated seven core legally enforceable human rights treaties. 13
12. The only comparable analysis I am aware of is Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen,
Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. I (1996), which sought to
extend Americans with Disabilities Act reasonable workplaee accommodations to members of
constitutionally protected classes.
13. Whether treaties are actually enforced, as well as the broader question of whether
international law is "law," has long been the subject of academic debate, the resolution of which goes
far beyond this Article. For now it bears noting that perhaps the most significant objection to the notion
of enforceability is the observation that under international law States parties retain the ability to opt
out of treaties, in whole or in part, as well as to reserve independent understandings of their application.
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Each of these hard laws implicitly protects persons with disabilities, but to
varying degrees. To invoke these protections, disabled persons must either
fall under a universal provision or possess a separately protected
characteristic in addition to his or her disability. To date, no United
Nations human rights treaty expressly applies to individuals on the basis of
a disability-related characteristic. 14
Two components of the International Bill of Human Rights, 15 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 16 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), 17 are universal in scope. 18 The same is true for the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT). 19 Although disability is not specifically mentioned in

For two very different perspectives on the implications of this State prerogative, compare Oona A.
Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821 (2003) (maintaining that traditional
understandings of treaty ratification do not adequately account for the likelihood of national
compliance) and Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, ill YALE L.J.
1935 (2002) (asserting that some number of States ratify human rights treaties as a means of avoiding
observance), with Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) (arguing that international human rights
treaties encourage domestic legal norm changes) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence
States], and Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 13 EuRo.
J. INT'L. L.l71 (2003) (same, while also critiquing the empirical evidence upon which Hathaway based
her conclusions). For a harmonizing approach, see Alex Geisinger & Michael Ashley Stein, A Theory
of Expressive International Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
14. Similarly, disabled persons are not explicitly included in non-treaty United Nations
instruments. For example, both the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights promote human rights, but neither expressly references disability. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 55, para C. (expressing an aspiration to promote "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), arts. 1-2, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. N810 (Dec. 12, 1948) (proclaiming that "all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights" and are "entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.") [hereinafter Universal Declaration!.
15. See Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1): International
Bill of Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6!2/fs2.htrn (the International Bill of Human
Rights is a collection of international instruments, including the Universal Declaration, ICCPR, ICESR,
and two Optional Protocols).
16. ICCPR, supra note 8.
ICESCR, supra note 9.
I7.
18. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 8, at pmbl. (averring that "recognition of the inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world"); ICESCR supra note 9, at art. 2, para. 2 (the rights
enumerated in the ICESCR "will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race,
colour ... or other status").
19. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, at 197, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
N39!51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafterCATJ.
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any of these treaties, they technically include all human beings within their
respective provinces. 20
In addition to these three universal treaties, the General Assembly has
enacted four hard law treaties protecting people based on specific identity
characteristics unrelated to disability. 21 In chronological order, these
are: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD); 22 the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDA W); 23 the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC); 24 and the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families (ICPMW). 25 The CRC alone among these treaties contains a
specific disability-related article; it requires that States parties recognize
the rights of children with disabilities to enjoy "full and decent" lives and
participate in their communities. 26 However, the relative financial
constraints of States parties tempers the obligation. Moreover, the CRC
20. See generally Gerard Quinn, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Disability: A Conceptual Framework, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS 69 (Theresia
Degener & Yolan Koster-Dreese eds., 1995) (hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS];
Philip Alston. Disability and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS, supra, at 94; Manfred Nowak & Walter Suntinger, The Right
of Disabled People Not to be Subjected to Torture, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS, supra, at 117.
21. These provisions are a mixed blessing. On the positive side, they provide an additional
avenue of proteetion for disabled persons experieneing "double discrimination" based on more than one
identity characteristic. For example, a person may suffer prejudice as a result of being disabled and of
Inuit heritage. On the negative side, they only protect individuals who encounter discrimination
serially. Because disability is almost uniformly relegated to "other" status, disabled people's rights are
frequently overlooked. One example of such disregard is the Declaration that proceeded from the 200 I
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance that
was convened in Durban, South Africa. See World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia & Related Intolerance, Aug. 31-Sept. 8, 200 I, Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.I89/12, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/Durban.pdf. Although
the Declaration encourages the General Assembly to enact disability specific human rights protection,
it does not include disability among the otherwise inclusive catalog of identity statuses it deemed to
suffer discrimination. See id. at para. I 80. More trenchantly, individuals whose rights are violated
"solely" due to their disability identity rceeive no added protection.
22. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106 (XX), at 47, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 14, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 12, 1965) [hereinafter
ICERD]; see generally Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on
the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 283 (1985).
23. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
24. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at 166, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC].
25. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, at 261, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N.
Doe. A/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990) [hereinafter ICPMW].
26. CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, para. I.
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does not mandate children with disabilities be treated or considered equal
to children without disabilities. 27 Hence, except for the CRC's limited
concern for disabled children, persons with disabilities are not yet a group
with specific protection.
In a 1993 report, a Special Rapporteur cautioned that in the absence of
specific treaty protection, human rights abuses against the disabled would
likely continue without redress. 28 Unfortunately, this prediction has largely
been borne out. In the decade following the report, seventeen disabilityrelated complaints have been asserted under core United Nations
instruments. Of these claims, thirteen were declared inadmissible by their
respective monitoring committees. 29 The larger implication is that at
present six hundred million persons with disabilities worldwide have
implied but not actual human rights protection.
B.

Soft Laws: United Nations Declarations and Resolutions

In contrast to hard law treaties that do not enumerate specific
disability protections, a number of soft laws expressly provide for disabled
individuals. 30 These include General Assembly designations of the
International Year of the Disabled in 198 I ,31 and the International Decade

27. See CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, paras. 1-3 ("[T]he disabled child has effective access to
and receives education, training ... preparataion for employment and recreational opportunities in a
manner conducive to the child's receiving the fullest possible social integration and individual
development."). The equality of disabled children has, however, been emphasized by the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOCl. Comm'n on
Human Rights, Rights ofthe Child, para. 22, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/75 (Apr. 25, 2001); U.N.
Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Rights of the Child, para. 29, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/RES/2000/85 (Apr. 27, 2000); see generally Thomas Hammarberg, The Rights of Disabled
Children-The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS,
supra note 20, at 147.
28. See LEANDRO DESPOUY, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS paras. 280-81
(1993), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/dispaperdesO.htm (noting that "persons with
disabilities are going to find themselves in a legal disadvantage in relation to other vulnerable groups"
because "unlike the other vulnerable groups, they do not have an international control body to provide
them with particular and specific protection").
29. The ICESCR, the CRC, and the ICPRAMW do not allow the assertion of individual
complaints. Individual complaints can be brought under the ICCPR, the CAT, the CEDAW, or the
ICERD. The website maintained by the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights contains
detailed information on the operation of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies. See Office of
the U.N. High Comm'r for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch (last visited Sept. 26, 2006). The
decisions of the three relevant monitoring committees can be accessed through the Netherlands Institute
of Human Rights web page. See Neth. lnst. of Human Rights, Welcome to the Sim Documentation Site,
http://sim.law.uu.nVsim/Dochome.nsf(under case law) (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
30. An overview of the basic documentation is maintained by a special unit of the Division for
Social Policy and Development from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
See United Nations Enable Webpage, www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable.
31. International Year of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 36/77, at 176, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess.,
Supp. No. 77, U.N. Doc. A/RES/36/77 (Dec. 8, 1981).
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of Disabled Persons from 1982-1991.32 The United Nations has also passed
resolutions such as the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded
Persons, 33 and the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons. 34
Additionally, the General Assembly adopted a World Programme of
Action Concerning Disabled Persons (WPA) to encourage the development
of national programs directed at achieving equality for people with
disabilities. 35
Most significant among the soft laws are the Standard Rules on the
Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities (Standard
Rules)/ 6 which are monitored by a Special Rapporteur. 37 The drawback to
these soft laws is that, as resolutions, they lack legally binding power. 38

C.

The Proposed United Nations Convention

Acting on previous proposals to address the lack of specific human
rights protection for disabled persons, 39 in December 200 1 the General
Assembly established an Ad Hoc Committee to consider enacting a
disability-based human rights instrument. 40 The Ad Hoc Committee in tum
32. Implementation of the World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res.
37/53, at 186-87, para. II, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/53 (Dec. 3,
1982).
33. Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856 (XXVI), at 93, U.N.
GAOR, Supp. No. 29, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (Dec. 20, 1971).
34. Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447 (XXX), at 88, U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975).
35. World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 37/52, at 185, U.N.
GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/52 (Dec. 3, 1982) [hereinafter World
Programme].
36. Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons With Disabilities, G.A. Res.
48/96, at 202, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess, Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/96 (Dec. 20, 1993)
[hereinafter Standard Rules].
37. The first Special Rapporteur for Disability, Bengt Lindquivist of Sweden, was appointed in
1994, and had his commission renewed in 1997 and in 2000. See United Nations Enable, The Special
Rapporteur on Disability of the Commission for Social Development, http://www.un.org/
esalsocdev/enable/rapporteur.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2006). The current Special Rapporteur for
Disability is Sheikha Hissa AI Thani of Qatar. /d. For an insider's perspective on the role of the Special
Rapporteur, see Bengt Lindqvist, Standard Rules in the Disability Field-A New United Nations
Instrument, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABLED PERSONS, supra note 20, at 63.
38. See, e.g., The Protection of Human Rights in the Context of Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), U.N.C.H.R. Res. 1997/33, U.N. ESCOR,
53rd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150 (Apr. II, 1997); The Protection of Persons with Mental
Illnesses and the Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, at 188, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (Dec. 17, 1991).
39. Notably, in 1987, Italy proffered a convention draft during the forty-second session of the
General Assembly. See U.N. GAOR, 42d Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/42/SR.I6 (Oct. 19, 1987).
Sweden did the same two years later at the General Assembly's forty-fourth session. See U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., 16th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/44/SR.16 (Oct. 24, 1989).
40. Comprehensive and Integral International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 56/168, U.N GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 168, U.N.
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authorized a working group to draw up a human rights treaty proposal. 41
On January 16, 2004, the working group issued "Draft Articles"; on
August 25, 2006, the last day of its eighth session negotiating and
amending the proposed treaty, the Ad Hoc Committee adopted the revised
Draft Articles. 42 The General Assembly is likely to adopt the convention
during the sixty-first session. The Draft Articles reaffirm the seven core
treaties 43 and operationalize their content. In pertinent part, the Articles
state their purpose as "to promote, protect, and ensure the full and equal
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons
with disabilities," 44 and enunciate essential principles guaranteeing
disabled individuals "individual autonomy and independence," "full
participation," and "inherent dignity and worth."45 Thus the Draft Articles
include both first- and second-generation rights, 46 and expressly call
attention to their indivisibility. 47 By way of enforcement, the proposed
instrument mandates collecting statistics and submitting reports to

Doc. A/RES/56/168 (Dec. 19, 2001). A detailed description of the political process behind the United
Nations decision to go forward with a disability human rights convention is set forth in the (United
States) National Council on Disability (NCO), Newsroom, UN Disability Convention-Topics at a
Glance: History of the Process, http://www.ncd.gov/newsroorn/publications/2003/history_process.htm
(last visited Oct. 3, 2006).
41. Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Prot. &
Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Pers. with Disabilities, Report of the Working Group to the Ad
Hoc Committee, para. I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2004/WG.l (Jan. 27, 2004). The working group
included twelve nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). See id. at para. 2. The inclusion of NGOs at
this stage was unprecedented in the normal course of treaty development at the United Nations, and can
be interpreted as acquiescence to NGOs' assertion of "nothing about us without us." Nonetheless, a
countcrsignal was also sent to the disability community by locating the working group in New Yorkthe location of United Nations expertise on soft laws-rather than in Geneva, where core human rights
treaties are deliberated.
42. See Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Prot.
& Promotion of the Rights & Dignity of Pers. with Disabilities, Draft Convention on the Rights of
Persons
with
Disabilities
and
Draft
Optional
Protocol
(2006),
available
at
http://www .un.org/esalsocdev/enable/rights/ahc8adart.htm [hereinafter Draft Articles}.
43. !d. at pmbl., para. d.
44. !d. at Article I. The Draft Articles state this goal is to be brought about through the use of
"international cooperation." !d. at para. j; see also CRC, supra note 24, at annex, pmbl. ("[r]ecognizing
the importance of international co-operation"); CEDAW, supra note 23, at 194 ("[a}ffirming that the
strengthening of ... mutual cooperation among all States" is necessary for effectuation).
45. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl. (!), (k), (a).
46. Among the first- and second-generation rights enumerated are: rights to life, equality,
expression, privacy, education, employment, health, habilitation and rehabilitation, social benefits,
political and social participation, access to public venues, mobility independence, recreation, as well as
freedom from discrimination, torture and abuse./d. at arts. 10, 12, 21, 22, 24, 27, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 9,
18, 30, 15-16. For a discussion of how these rights intersect and are harmonious with the capabilities
approach, see infra Part Ill.B.
47. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl., para. c ("Reaffirming the universality, indivisibility
and interdependence of all human rights and fundamental freedoms .... ") (emphasis omitted).
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domestic monitoring bodies, 48 developing national policies for disabled
citizens, 49 generally promoting positive attitudes toward persons with
disabilities, 5° and establishing a treaty body similar to those of the existing
seven core conventions. 51
Unfortunately, the Draft Articles leave several central terms,
including "disability" and "accessibility," conspicuously undefined 52
because of political motivations. 53 Yet the Draft Articles do expansively
define "discrimination" as "any distinction, exclusion or restriction" that
affects "the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with
others, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms." 54 The Draft
Articles, and the definitions included therein, indicate a significant shift in
how the international community views human rights, suggesting a
willingness to rethink the sparse human rights protections specifically
provided to persons with disabilities.
II
THE SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY

The social model of disability asserts that contingent social conditions
rather than inherent biological limitations constrain individuals' abilities
and create a disability category. Beginning in the 1970s, international soft
laws addressing disability have increasingly adopted precepts from the
social model. Nevertheless, because advocates have limited the social
model to formal equality theory, its application is limited within the human
rights arena.

48. See id. at art. 31 ("States parties undertake to collect appropriate information, ineluding
statistical and research data."); id. at art. 33 (States parties are responsible for establishing systems for
monitoring implementation).
49. See id. at art. 4, para. B; art. 33.
50. See id. at art. 8. These measures include instigating "public awareness campaigns,"
mainstreaming public education, and "encouraging" positive images of the disabled in the mass media.
/d. at art. 8, para. 2 (a)-( c).
51. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 34.
52. See id. at art. 2 (definitions).
53. Specifically, to secure broad support in the General Assembly, several of the Working Group
members believed these definitions should be purposely left vague so that States parties could interpret
them according to their own legal and social cultures. Put another way, there was strong feeling among
the participating government bodies that human rights enforcement is chiefly a local issue. As related
in the NCD newsroom, the United States took an even more removed position, asserting that the matter
of disability-related rights, in any form, was a "largely domestic mission" that individual states ought to
pursue on their own initiatives. See Nat'! Council on Disability (NCD) Newsroom, supra note 40
(quoting Ralph Boyd, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights). For that reason, the
United States rarely participated in the convention process and does not intend to ratify any resultant
instrument. See id. (U.S. would '"participate in order to share our experiences ... [but] not with the
expectatoin that we [the U.S.] will become party to any resulting legal instrument.").
54. See Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 2.
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The Social Model versus the Medical Model

The common misperception of disability conforms to the "medical"
model, which views a disabled person's limitations as inherent, naturally
and properly excluding her from participating in mainstream culture.
Under this framework, people with disabilities are believed incapable of
performing social functions because of medical conditions that impair
various major life activities. As a consequence of this notion, disabled
persons are either systemically excluded from social opportunity-such as
receiving social welfare benefits in lieu of employment-or are accorded
limited social participation-such as the case of educating disabled
children in separate schools. 55
In contrast to the medical model, disability studies scholars have long
argued for an understanding of disability through a "social" modet5 6 This
framework maintains that the socially engineered environment and the
attitudes reflected in its construction play a central role in creating
"disability." According to the social model, collectively mandated
decisions determine what conditions comprise the bodily norm in any
given society. 57 Thus, factors external to a disabled person's limitations are
really what determine that individual's ability to function. 58 Just as some
cultures view female leaders as less capable than male leaders, 59 most
55. See generally Kenny Fries, Introduction, in STARING BACK: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE
FROM THE INSIDE OuT 6-7 (Kenny Fries ed., 1997) (noting that "[the medical] view of
disability ... puts the blame squarely on the individual"); CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITY AS A
SOCIAL CONSTRUCT (I 988) ([T]he "medical/pathological paradigm" of disability stigmatizes the
disabled by conditioning their inclusion only "on the terms of the able bodied majority.").
56.
Disability studies is an academic discipline analogous to that of critical race or feminist
theory, witb dedicated university departments. See Gary L. Albrecht et al., Introduction: The
Formation of Disability Studies, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES I, 1-8 (GARY L. ALBRECT et al.
eds., 200 I).
57. See generally Richard K. Scotch & Kay Schriner, Disability as Human
Variation: Implications for Policy, 549 ANNALS AAPSS 148 (1997).
58. See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability. Sexuality and Law: New Issues and
Agendas, 4. S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 97 (1995); Ron Amundson, Disability, Handicap, and
the Environment, 23 J. Soc. PHIL. 105 (1992). The framework derives from both British and American
disability rights scholars, although the latter have written more extensively on the legal implications of
the model. Some scholars credit Michael Oliver with orginating the social model theory. See MICHAEL
OLIVER, SOCIAL WORK WITH DISABLED PEOPLE 23 (1983) (the social model is "nothing more
fundamental than a switch away from focusing on the physical limitations of particular individuals to
the way the physical and social environments impose limitations on certain groups or eategories of
people"). Political scientist Jacobus tenBroek made an early contribution to the development of the
social model of disability in his classic article. See Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the
World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CALif. L. REV. 841, 842 (1966) (demonstrating how
people with disabilities were historically held to higher duties of care in respect to the law of torts
because they were perceived as inherently less able to engage in social functions).
59. See, e.g., THE ETHNOGRAPHY Of MALINOWSKI: THE TROBRIAND ISLANDS 1915-18 Ill, 12831 (Michael W. Young ed., 1979) (the Trobriand society is a matrilineal society, believing that fathers
have "nothing to do with the formation of [their child's] body," and that all lineage passes through the
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societies have historically assumed disabled persons are less capable than
nondisabled persons. 60 The social model underscores the manner in which
disability is culturally constructed. 61
B.

The Social Model and United Nations Instruments

International resolutions relating to disabled persons were initially
steeped in the medical model. 62 Particularly influential among post-World
War II international instruments was the "whole man" schema of

mother's side of the family); ROBERT BRIFFAULT, THE MOTHERS: THE MATRIARCHAL THEORY OF
SOCIAL ORIGINS 194-95 (1931) (classifying various American Indian tribes, such as the Navajo and
Cheyenne, as matriarchal).
60. See, e.g., Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability Human Rights, Law, and Policy, in HANDBOOK
OF DISABILITY STUDIES supra note 56, at 565, 567 (noting the commonly held assumption that
"[d]isability is an abnormality, a lack, and a limitation of capacity"). The results of a recent study of
prevailing attitudes towards individuals with intellectual disabilities across ten very different countries
reflect this misperception. See MULTINATIONAL STUDY OF ATTITUDES TOWARD INDIVIDUALS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: GENERAL FINDING AND CALLS TO ACTION (2003), available at
http://www.soill.org/pdfs/multinational_study.pdf. However, a minority of cultures believe people with
disabilities are especially capable of various functions. In certain Asian countries-for example
China-visually-impaired people are frequently trained and valued as masseuses. Moreover, it is illegal
for those with ordinary vision to be employed as a masseuse in Taiwan. See DPP City Councilors Say
Lein Received Sighted Massage, TAIPEI TIMES, Sept. 27, 2003, at 3, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2003/09/27/2003069422. Indeed, there are social
anthropologists who claim that the notion of "disability," at least as a negative concept, is Western in
origin and remains unknown to certain cultures, including some African societies. See, e.g., Aud Talle,
A Child is a Child: Disability and Equality among the Kenya Maasai, in DISABILITY AND CULTURE 56
(Benedicte 1ngstad & Susan Reynolds Whyte eds., 1995); Benedicte lngstad, Mpho ya Modimo--A Gift
from God: Perspectives on "Attitudes" Toward Disabled Persons, in DISABILITY AND CuLTURE,
supra, at 246.
61. Philosopher Anita Silvers provides an eloquent application of the social model of disability to
the aceommodations required by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and her underlying
theory applies equally well to the statute's international progeny. ANITA SILVERS, Formal Justice, in
DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 13 (Anita Silvers et at. eds., 1998). She argues that being physiologically anomalous is viewed
as abnormal only because a dominant group imposed eonditions favorable to its own circumstances,
and not because of"any biological mandate or evolutionary triumph." !d. at 73. Accordingly, the soeial
model of disability recognizes the source of disabled people's relative disadvantage as a hostile
environment that is "artificial and remediable" instead of"natural and immutable." !d. at 74-75. "If the
majority of people, instead of just a few, wheeled rather than walked, graceful spiral ramps instead of
jarringly angular staircases would connect lower to upper floors of buildings." /d. at 74. Thus, a
wheelchair-user experiences disability through antagonistic surroundings, including lack of access to
workplaces, educational programs, medical services, and other areas open to the public. Because the
ADA accommodations seek to eliminate subordination of individuals with disabilities, Silvers argues
that the statute implieitly utilizes the social model of disability, and as such is a product of formal and
equalizing justice.
62. The same may be said for both the United States and Europe. See, e.g., RICHARD K. ScoTCH,
FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY POLICY (2d ed. 2001)
(assessing the motivations impelling United States policy); Lisa Waddington, Reassessing the
Employment of People with Disabilities in Europe: From Quotas to Anti-Discrimination Laws, 18
COMP. LAB. L.J. 62 (1996) (examining the theories informing European employment policies).
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vocational rehabilitationY This method sought to "treat" disabled persons
to facilitate their social participation. In this way, the method further
instantiated the medical model's notion that people with disabilities, rather
than society, must change. 64 For example, the General Assembly and the
United Nations Economic and Social Council adopted a series of
resolutions during the 1950s and 1960s directed both at preventing future
disability and at rehabilitating existing disabilities. 65 Indeed, the title of the
Economic and Social Council's 1950 resolution-Social Rehabilitation of
the Physically Handicapped-indicates a policy targeting disabled people
as the locus of treatment, rather than the external environment.
However, beginning in the 1970s international instruments evidenced
a gradual shift from the medical model to the social model of disability. 66
Consequently, both the 1971 Declaration on the Rights of Mentally
Retarded Persons and the 1975 Declaration on the Rights of Disabled
Persons acknowledge the equality of disabled individuals. 67 Yet, these
instruments possessed vestiges of the medical model by assuming
individuals are disabled due to "special" medical problems that require
segregated social services and institutions as remedies. 68 It was the
following decade that saw a more thorough adoption of the social model of
disability in United Nations instruments. 69
Acting on the aphorism "[f]ull participation and equality," the United
Nations proclaimed 1981 the International Year of the Disabled, and the

63. The term originates with political scientist Ruth O'Brien. See RuTH ANN O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE (2001).
64. See HOWARD A. RUSK, REHABILITATION MEDICINE (1964); HENRY HoWARD KESSLER,
REHABILITATION OF THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED (2d ed. 1953). The timing of the medical model,
as advanced by these two medical practitioners, was hardly coincidental. Scientific advances made
during World War II resulted in higher survival rates for severely wounded soldiers. See, e.g., SuRGERY
IN WoRLD WAR II: NEUROSURGERY (John Boyd Coates, Jr. ed., 1959) (describing medical advances in
neurosurgery, particularly in relation to treating spinal cord injuries).
65. See MARIA RITA SAULLE, DISABLED PERSONS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (1982)
(providing a catalog of these resolutions); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Social
Rehabilitation of the Physically Handicapped, Report of the Social Commission, 6th Sess., U.N. Doc.
No. E/AC.7.1L.24 (July 13, 1950).
66.
International soft laws are comparable to legislation passed in the United States and Europe
over that same period requiring the provision of reasonable accommodation as an ameliorative to
disabling environments. See generally BRIAN J. DOYLE, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: THE NEW LAW
(1996); CHRISTOPHER G. BELL, U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF
INDIVIDUAL ABILITIES (1983).
67.
For example, the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons declares that
persons with disabilities have the same civil and political rights as other human beings. Declaration on
the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, supra note 33, at para. 4.
68. See, e.g., id. at pmbl. (emphasizing the need to protect disabled persons and their access to
segregated services); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, supra note 34, at para. 8
(underscoring the needs of disabled persons to "special" services).
69.
QuiNN ET AL., supra note I, at 30 (characterizing the change as "an irreversible shift").
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succeeding decade as the International Decade of Disabled Persons. 70 More
significantly, in 1982 the General Assembly also enacted the path-breaking
WP A. 71 Although this pronouncement reiterated the twin medical model
goals of preventing and rehabilitating disability, it also advocated
equalized opportunities for the disabled. 72 The latter aspiration was defined
as "the process through which the general system of society, such as the
physical and cultural environment" is rendered accessible. 73 Moreover, the
WP A emphasized the insufficiency of rehabilitation to achieve this
purpose. Instead, "[e]xperience shows that it is largely the environment
which determines the effect of an impairment or a disability on a person's
daily life."74
Continuing the trend toward full adoption of the social model, the
1990s were "a banner period for disability law." 75 Passed in 1993, the
Standard Rules remain the central United Nations document regarding
disabled persons. The Standard Rules build on the WP A, both emphasizing
the equality of people with disabilities and defining disability as a
byproduct of social construction. For example, the instrument underscores
the need to change general societal misperceptions about the disabled as
well as provide sufficient services to support their full inclusion. 76 Though
the Standard Rules are monitored by a Special Rapporteur/ 7 the instrument
is soft law and legally unenforceable. The Standard Rules nevertheless
stress that States parties are under "a strong moral and political
commitment" to ensure "the equalization of opportunities" for disabled
persons. 78
70. World Programme, supra note 35, at 185.
71. /d.
72. Equalizing opportunities was defined as "the process through which the general system of
society, such as the physical and cultural environment" is rendered accessible. World Programme of
Action Concerning Disabled Persons I ( 1982), available at http:/lwww.un.org/esa/socdev/
enable/diswpaO l.htm.
73. /d.
74. See id. at 2.
75. Theresia Degener, International Disability Law-A New Legal Subject on the Rise: The
Interregional Experts' Meeting in Hong Kong, December 13-17, 1999, 18 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 180,
184 (2000).
76. See Standard Rules, supra note 36, at rules I, 4. The social model of disability is reflected in
the articulation of the Standard Rules' aspirations: "the planning of societies and that all resources must
be employed in such a way as to ensure that every individual has equal opportunity for participation."
/d. at introduction, para. 25.
77. Reports issued by the Special Rapporteur are available at U.N. Enable, The Special
Rapporteur on Disability of the Commission for Social Development, http:/lwww.un.org/esa/
socdev/enable/rapporteur.htm.
78. For a discussion of the unenforceability of the Standard Rules, see Dimitris Michailakis, The
Standard Rules: A Weak Instrument and a Strong Commitment, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY AND
LEGAL CHANGE 117 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks eds., 1999). The Standard Rules stress
that States parties are under a strong moral and political commitment to ensure the equalization of
opportunities for disabled persons. See Standard Rules, supra note 36, at introduction, para. 14.
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The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (Vienna
Declaration) was also enacted in 1993. 79 It was not directed specifically
toward disability rights, 80 but it nonetheless stressed the prevalence of
disabled persons. Moreover, the Vienna Declaration assisted in
accelerating the trend toward the social model of disability by maintaining
that disabled persons "should be guaranteed equal opportunity through the
elimination of all socially determined barriers," including any "physical,
financial, social or psychological" obstacles that "exclude or restrict full
participation in society."81
Finally, passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) during
this period bears special notice. 82 While domestic in scope, it has to date
influenced more than forty countries to enact similar-and at times nearly
verbatim-legislation. 83 The European Union's Employment Framework
Directive adopts key ADA definitions, 84 and the Draft Articles follow suit. 85
Accordingly, international disability rights advocates point to the statute as a
model worthy of emulation. 86
The social model has also been well supported in the new millennium.
The General Assembly World Summit on Social Development
acknowledged the necessity of changing the socially constructed
environment in accordance with the Standard Rules "to empower persons

Moreover, the Standard Rules obligate States parties "to create the legal bases ... to achieve the
objectives of full participation and equality for persons with disabilities," to "ensure that organizations
of persons with disabilities are involved in the development of national legislation concerning" their
rights, and to eliminate "[a]ny discriminatory provisions against persons with disabilities." !d. at rule
15.
79. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action, U.N. Doc NCONF. 157/24 (July 12, 1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration].
80. !d. at para. 5 ("All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated.").
81. !d. at para. 64 (disabled persons "should be guaranteed equal opportunity through the
elimination of all socially determined barriers," including any "physical, financial, social or
psychological" obstacles that "exclude or restrict full participation in society").
82. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101 (2000).
83. See Theresia Degener & Gerard Quinn, A Survey ofInternational, Comparative and Regional
Disability Law Reform, in DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW AND POLICY: INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES 3 (Mary Lou Breslin & Silvia Vee eds., 2002).
84. For a discussion of the role and content of reasonable accommodation under the EU directive,
The Framework Employment Directive from a Disability
see Lisa Waddington,
Perspective: Reasonable Accommodation and Positive Action, in DISABILITY RIGHTS' AcTIVIST AND
ADVOCATES TRAINING MANUAL 19 (2005).
85. See, e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 27, para. i (requiring States parties to make
reasonable accommodations).
86. See, e.g., Katharina C. Heyer, The ADA on the Road: Disability Rights in Germany, 27 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 723 (2002); Eric A. Besner, Employment Legislation for Disabled Individuals: What
Can France Learn from the Americans with Disabilities Act?, I 6 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 399 (1995). Despite
this trend, there are some disability rights advocates, including myself, who caution against adopting
ADA-type rights protection exclusively. See infra Part II.C.
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with disabilities to play their full role in society."87 But perhaps the most
progressive enunciation in an international instrument is found in the Draft
Articles, which recognize "the importance of accessibility to the physical,
social and economic environment" as a means of "redressing the profound
social disadvantage of persons with disabilities."88 By this recognition, the
Draft Articles transcend the social model and adopt a "human right to
development" approach, integrating first- and second-generation rights.

C.

Limitations of the Social Model

The above historical overview attests to the social model's powerful
and constructive influence on international and domestic instruments.
Nevertheless, because the framework's advocates have invoked only
formal equality theory, the model encounters two obstacles. First, because
it expressly relies on notions of corrective justice, the social model must
overcome erroneous but strongly held notions that the world inevitably
exclU<ies disabled persons. Second, and of greater significance, because it
exclusively concentrates on first-generation rights, the social model is
prevented from invoking a full range of second-generation rights.
In asserting that the socially constructed environment creates
disabling conditions, the social model avers that altering that environment
allows disabled persons to participate in society at large. Reasonable
workplace accommodations are a typical example of correcting artificially
prejudicial conditions previously held out as "neutral." Providing
accommodations in the workplace changes existing hierarchies, ultimately
suggesting a lack of inevitability in the structure and conception of
particular occupations. By removing unnecessary barriers to participation,
accommodations bring about equality as conceived by formal justice. 89
However, because the social model is based exclusively on this notion of
corrective justice, it must overcome the deeply entrenched fallacy that
society justifiably excludes disabled persons due to their inherent
limitations. 90 In seeking to win this fight, social model advocates have taken
an over-inclusive position of rejecting all, instead of many or most,
disability-related exclusions as arising from arbitrarily selected biological
87. G.A. Res. S-24/2, para. 66, U.N. Doc NRES/S-24/2 (July I, 2000). See also Theresia
Degener, Disabled Persons and Human Rights: The Legal Framework, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DISABLED PERSONS, supra note 20, at 9, 20-33.
88. Draft Articles, supra note 42, at pmbl., paras. t, v.
89. See Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle. Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 579 (2004) (arguing that ADA-mandated accommodations are
consistent with other antidiscrimination measures in that each remedies exclusion from employment
opportunity by questioning the inherency of established workplace norms, and by engendering cost when
altering those norms) [hereinafter Stein, Same Struggle].
90. The view is so prevalent that one scholar has termed it "canonical." Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,643-44 (2001).
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norms. 91 This effort is unnecessary because correcting exclusionary
conditions (and the attitudes supporting them) need not be contingent on
the application of first-generation rights alone. Instead, social inclusion is
better facilitated under a human rights paradigm that applies civil and
political rights (that equalize treatment) in combination with economic,
social, and cultural rights (that equalize opportunity).
This brings forward the second, and more important, problem: while
the social model's precepts are essential to civil rights assertions, they
ultimately fall short within the human rights field. The social model draws
an inclusive, yet firm line at equal treatment of equally situated
individuals, 92 thereby effectively excluding additional second-generation
support for disabled persons not contingent on narrower corrective justice
notions. 93 By contrast, second-generation rights recognize that all disabled
persons are entitled to equal opportunities because of their equal humanity,
not because they reach levels of functional sameness, 94 and thereby allows
for individual differences among people with disabilities.
In so doing, second-generation rights cover two circumstances. They
encompass entitlements that benefit persons with disabilities who fall
outside standard sameness arguments. This is because some individual
variations are not accounted for, even when using broad and inclusive
principles, for instance those contained in the architectural concept of
Universal Design. 95 Second-generation rights also include measures that
91. A particularly strong version of this assertion is that of feminist and disability rights advocate
Susan Wendell who avers that "the entire physical and social organization of life" has been created
with the notion in mind that "everyone w[as] physically strong, as though all bodies were shaped the
same, as though everyone could walk, hear, and see well, as though everyone could work and play at a
pace that is not compatible with any kind of illness or pain." SusAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED
BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 39 (1996). Wendell's point, although
valid, should not be overstated. Because I generally agree with the disability studies perspective, but
disagree on the extent of its application, I have used the term "artificial" to mean avoidable (because it
is either arbitrary and/or can be remedied through a manageable cost) when discussing ADA
accommodations. See Stein, Same Struggle, supra note 89.
92. In other words, the social model is predicated on treating like cases alike. For what is perhaps
the earliest exposition of this theory, see ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 118-19 (Martin Ostwald
trans., 1962) (professing that things that are alike should be treated alike).
93. Social, economic, and cultural rights are derived from the field of social justice which
advocates treating all individuals equally, whether or not they are in fact equal. See, e.g., JoHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JuSTICE 302-03 (1971) (defining distributive justice generally as the theory that "[a]ll
social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are
to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage
of the least favored").
94. "Human rights are, literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being ....
Human rights are equal rights: one either is or is not a human being, and therefore has the same human
rights as everyone else (or none at all)." JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RJGHTS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 10 (2003).
95. The central tenet of Universal Design is an "approach to creating environments and products
that are usable by all people to the greatest extent possible." R. Mace et al., Accessible
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are necessary to effectuate first-generation rights. Thus, while firstgeneration rights may prohibit discrimination in employment, secondgeneration rights make labor market participation possible by providing
health care, education, and employment preferences and quotas. By
limiting their advocacy to first-generation rights, social model proponents
have neglected further empowering possibilities. 96 The adoption of a
"disability human rights" model can solve these limitations.
III
THE DISABILITY HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM

This Part outlines the disability human rights paradigm, which
integrates the best features of the social model of disability, the human
right to development, and Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach to
create a comprehensive view of rights. The social model stresses society's
role in constructing disability and its responsibility to rectify disabilitybased exclusion. Yet, because advocates have justified this scheme
exclusively though formal justice notions, the model has neglected
economic, social and cultural rights. The human right to development,
which underlies the Draft Articles, seamlessly combines first- and secondgeneration rights, thus avoiding a major shortcoming of the social model of
disability. At the same time, this framework is as vulnerable to monitoring,
content, and resource prioritization concerns as are more traditional
versions of human rights. Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach
Environments: Toward Universal Design, in DESIGN INTERVENTIONS: TOWARDS A MORE HUMANE
ARCHITECTURE 155, 156 (Wolfgang Prieser et a!. eds., 1991). Although the inclusive nature of
Universal Design extends beyond disability, e.g., Selwyn Goldsmith, Access all Areas, 213
ARCHITECTs' J. 42 (2001) (asserting that universal design encompasses not only people with
disabilities but also parents with small children and women forced to wait for pubic toilets), it is
nevertheless frequently described as a disability-specific issue. For rebuttals of this perspective, see
ROBERT IMRIE, DISABILITY AND THE CITY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (1996).
96. Clarification is in order. Disability rights advocates applying the social model to this
hypothetical instance would surely argue that both public transportation systems and health care
systems that excluded disabled persons based on socially contingent factors (e.g., physically
inaccessible buses and insurance policies that exclude coverage for people with AIDS) were artificial in
nature (because there was no reason to have buses with steps as opposed to ramped ones, and that there
was no intrinsic difference between treating pneumonia arising from the flu as opposed to HIV). What
disability rights advocates have not traditionally done is link the two concepts so that equality in the
artificially excluded workplace also mandates equality in the artificially excluded public transportation
and health care areas. The reason for this disconnect is that the two arguments cannot be joined so long
as the underlying basis of their assertions is formal justice, meaning that the extent of disabled versus
non-disabled equality is assessed in terms of sameness under civil rights statutes that focus on the acts
or omissions of one actor (whether an employer or a public service entity) rather than of society at
large. This subtle weakness of disability rights advocacy has recently been taken up by Samuel
Bagenstos. He points out that as far as the ADA is concerned, there is no statutory reason why the
provision of a reasonable accommodation ought to stop at the workshop door. Samuel R. Bagenstos,
The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. I, 26-32 (2004) (discussing the importance of proper
health care to ensure greater employment opportunities).
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creates a fertile space within which to understand the reach and content of
the human right to development. However, because her scheme requires
levels of minimal function as a condition precedent to acknowledging an
individual's equal humanity and social participation, it is fundamentally
under-inclusive of some people with intellectual disabilities, conditions the
inclusion of others through proxies, and inadequately accounts for the
development of individual talent. By harnessing the assets of the human
right to development and the capabilities approach, the disability human
rights paradigm overcomes the foregoing limitations. It both acknowledges
the role that social circumstances play in creating disabling conditions and
insists on the development of all individual talent.
A.

The Human Right to Development

The human right to development is the most recent theory of human
rights and underlies contemporary treaties, including the Draft Articles.
This third-generation of human rights integrates civil and political rights
with economic, social, and cultural rights. 97 Consequently, the human right
to development avoids a major conceptual and practical shortfall of the
social model of disability. Nevertheless, this framework can neither avoid
nor satisfy three concerns endemic to human rights treaties: the efficacy of
monitoring devices, the sufficiency of content, and prioritization issues
when State resources are limited. 98
Though of comparatively recent origin, the right to development has
gained purchase over the past several years. In I 986, the General
Assembly's Declaration on the Right to Development established
development as a human right. 99 Subsequently, the 1993 Vienna
Declaration proclaimed the right to development was "a universal and
inalienable right" as well as "an integral part of fundamental human
rights." 100 In 1998, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
approved a resolution requiring the United Nations Economic and Social
97. See generally Stephen P. Marks, Emerging Human Rights: A New Generation for the 1980s?,
33 RuTGERs L. REv. 435,435-52 (1981).
98. For additional, more tangential concerns, see Stephen P. Marks, The Human Right to
Development: Between Rhetoric and Reality, 17 HARV. HuM. RTS. J. 137 (2004).
99. Declaration on the Right to Development, G.A. Res. 41/128, at 183, Annex, U.N. GAOR,
41st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986). A few General Assembly
resolutions referenced the right to development prior to the DRD. See, e.g., U.N. ESCOR, 33d Sess.,
Supp. No.6, at 74-75, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1257; U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., Supp. No 6, at 107, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1347; U.N. ESCOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No 5, at 238, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1475.
100. Vienna Declaration, supra note 79, at para. 10; see also High Comissioner for the Promotion
and Protection of All Human Rights, G.A. Res. 48/141, at 261, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/141 (Dec. 20, 1993) (General Assembly mandate that the High Commissioner for
Human Rights organize "a new branch whose primary responsibilities would include the promotion and
protection of the right to development") [hereinafter High Commissioner].
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Council to appoint both an Independent Expert and an open-ended working
group on the right to development. 101 The Office of the High
Commissioner on Human Rights maintains a research department to
coordinate development tasks within the United Nations system. 102
Though lacking legal enforceability, the human right to development
nonetheless persuaded academics, 103 United Nations agencies, 104 and
States 105 to accept the inextricable interrelationship among first- and
second-generation human rights. Unfortunately, for reasons development
scholar Peter Uvin decries as both outmoded and counter-productive, this
generational rights divide manifested into a partition of labor and perceived
expertise among international actors. 106 Influenced by the human right to
development, many experts now share Uvin's belief that first- and secondgeneration rights are neither conceptually, nor pragmatically immiscible. 107
Cass Sunstein finds exclusive focus on one of these types of rights
101.
E.S.C. Res. 72, at 229, U.N. ESCOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No.3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/177
(1998).
102.
High Comissioner, supra note 100, at 262 (mandating the OHCHR "Research and Right to
Development Branch" to "[r]ecognize the importance of promoting a balanced and sustainable
development for all people" and to "to enhance support from relevant bodies of the United Nations
system for this purpose." For the Independent Expert's perspective, see Arjun Sengupta, Development
Co-operation and the Right to Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR THE
DOWNTRODDEN: EssAYS IN HONOUR OF AS BJORN EIDE 371 (Morten 8ergsmo ed., 2003).
103. See, e.g., Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to
Development, I HARV. HuM. RTs. Y.B. 3 (1988) [hereinafter Alston, Making Space for New Human
Rights]; see also Henry J. Steiner, Social Rights and Economic Development: Converging Discourses?,
4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 25 (1998); James C.N. Paul, The Human Right to Development: Its
Meaning and Importance, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 235 (1992); Anne Orford, Globalization and the
Right to Development, in PEOPLE's RIGHTS 127 (Philip Alston ed., 2001 ).
104.
For instance, the United Nations Development Programme now explicitly connects these
rights in its annual Human Development Reports. See U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2003, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A COMPACT AMONG NATIONS TO END HUMAN
POVERTY (2003), available at http:/lhdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/ [hereinafter MILLENNIUM
DEVELOPMENT COMPACT].
I 05. See Alan Rosas, The Right to Development, in EcoNOMIC, SociAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
247, 248 (Asbjom Eide et al. eds., 1995) (averring that the human right to development gave
developing nations a moral basis in which to ground their demands for more equitable distribution of
worldwide resources from more developed nations).
I 06. PETER UviN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2004). Uvin argues against this prevailing
notion by pointing out that both agendas have similar and overlapping goals. To give one example, he
notes that if a human rights perspective is added to a traditional development goal of providing
subsistence, then the problem of guaranteeing sufficient food in a country is revised towards identifYing
the factors that limit that availability, that is, "the wide range of mechanisms that exclude some groups
from services or resources the state makes available; the way discriminatory employment, land, credit,
inheritance or edueation policies." /d. at 161.
107. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 247 (2d ed. 2000) ("The interdependence principle, apart from its
use as a political compromise between advocates of one or two covenants, reflects the fact that the two
sets of rights ean neither logically nor practically be separated in watertight compartments."); C.B.
MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 111-12 (1973) (disputing Berlin's fixation
on negative liberty by pointing out the material prerequisites to meaningful ehoices).
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theoretically artificial and unsatisfying. 108 Jack Donnelly goes further,
asserting all human rights "require both positive action and restraint by the
State if they are going to be effectively implemented." 109 As an example,
he points out that the right to vote requires both freedom from restraints on
political expression and affirmative government expenditure in facilitating
the franchise's exercise. 110
Recent United Nations instruments concur with the academic
consensus and emphasize incorporating these rights. The CEDA W
demonstrates this integrated approach to human rights by demanding both
prevention of direct discrimination and reinvention of environments to
eviscerate the more subtle effects of cultural bias. 111 One may say the same
for recent instruments specifically relating to disabled persons. During the
1995 World Summit for Social Development, the General Assembly stated
that ensuring equal employment for disabled persons requires not only reorganization of the workplace environment, but also direct "measures
which enhance education and acquisition of skills," and indirect measures
such as hiring and retention incentives for employers. 112 Similarly, the
Committee on the CRC requires creating conditions to ensure disabled
children's "dignity" and "self-reliance" by eliminating prejudice and
promoting "active participation in the community" through meaningful
access to education, rehabilitation services, and health care. 113 The Draft
Articles likewise challenge the role the constructed environment plays in
excluding people with disabilities from participating in civil and political life,
and charges societies to make broad-based changes altering entrenched social
norms. 114 By juxtaposing positive and negative rights within the same
scheme, the human right to development ultimately avoids the perils
associated with their division. In this respect, incorporating the human right to

108. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees? 5 (U. of Chicago, Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper
No. 36, 2003) (rights "cannot exist simply with government abstinence").
109. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 25 (2d ed. 1998).
II 0. /d.; see also Brad R. Roth, The CEDA Was a Collective Approach to Women's Rights, 24
MicH. J. INT'L L. 187, 203 (2002) ("[A] line between 'direct' and 'indirect' interferences with the
range of chosen activity seems not only arhitrary, but potentially ohfuscatory, absolving politics of
responsihility for the greater part of the real impediments to chosen activity, and characterizing as
'free' a polity in which individuals are as effectively constrained, perhaps, as those in an 'unfree'
polity.").
Ill. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 107, at 197 (adding that "[t]he formal removal of barriers
and the introduction of temporary special measures to encourage the equal participation of both men
and women in the public life of their societies are essential prerequisites to true equality in political
life").
112. G.A. Res. S-24/2, para. 67, U.N. Doc A/RES/S-24/2 (July I, 2000).
113. See CRC, supra note 24, at art. 23, para. I.
114. See generally Draft Articles, supra note 42.
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development into the current disability rights paradigm improves on the
social model of disability.
Though its ability to integrate first- and second-generation rights ts
valuable, the human right to development maintains concerning
limitations. This model cannot overcome or provide more satisfactory
solutions to three problems common to human rights frameworks. 115 The
first problem is effective monitoring of international instruments. As one
commentator has archly but accurately put it, the current monitoring
system "constitute[s] some of the most powerless, under-funded,
formulaic, and politically manipulated institutions of the United
Nations." 116 This opprobrium may well prove true for monitoring any
disability human rights treaty. Ultimately, in the absence of either dramatic
change to the politics of world governance or radical treaty body reform, 117
the efficacy of monitoring any human rights treaty largely depends on
extra-legal factors that cannot be built into instruments. These concerns
include moral persuasion, political pressure, and the willingness and ability
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and grassroots movements to
raise social awareness. 118
The second problem the human right to development shares with
other human rights treaties is that it fails to provide adequate guidance on
its substance and boundaries. In some measure, this is a practically driven,
semi-intentional design flaw. As aspirational statements drafted to gamer
widespread support, human rights conventions are often necessarily

115. Uvin identifies debates over "Western-centrism" as a fourth, insurmountable concern. UvtN,
supra note I 06, at 31. However, some commentators claim that central themes of human rights theory
are common to all cultures and faiths, even if expressed in different ways. See, e.g., HANS KuNG, A
GLOBAL ETHIC FOR GLOBAL POLITICS AND EcONOMICS (1998); ABDULLAH! AHMED AN-NA'tM,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (1992).
116. UvtN, supra note 106, at 140.
117. The efficacy of the United Nations treaty system is a subject that far exceeds this Article.
Briefly, the most recent attempt at overhauling the system was given impetus by the SecretaryGeneral's second reform report of 2002, Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further
Change, U.N. Doc. A/57/387 (Sept. 9, 2002), which calls for more coordination among monitoring
bodies, greater standardization of reporting requirements, and increased monitoring at the national
level.
118. See Michael J. Perry, Protecting Human Rights in a Democracy: What Role for the Courts?,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 641 (2003) (distinguishing human rights as moral, rather than legal,
rights). Some exogenous factors are described in Goodman & Jinks, How to Influence States. supra
note 13. Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of
International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1229, 1303-29 (2003), use game theory to
demonstrate the efficacy of international judicial decisions in the absence of sanctions, and provides
empirical data support from the International Court of Justice's docket. In very stark contrast, JACK
LANDMAN GOLDSMITH & ERIC. A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005), proffers a
realpolitik explanation for international adjudication based on rational actor theory that is largely
immune from external influence.
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expressed at a high degree of abstraction. 119 Consequently, these
instruments' stated goals often fall short of their objectives, due in part to a
lack of substantive content. Ambiguous-and sometimes even
unambiguous-treaty terminology can mean very different things
depending on a State's laws, norms, and culture. 120
The third problem beleaguering the human right to development
concerns prioritization of resources. Human rights instruments often
contain language limiting application in relation to the financial
capabilities of State parties. 121 In accordance with these textual limitations,
States short of funds are more likely to implement rights that are either
easier to achieve or are perceived as having greater utility or political
cachet. Conversely, States are less likely to promote rights where
realization is thought either more challenging, less encompassing, or out of
political favor. 122
While only broad institutional solutions can adequately amend
monitoring deficiencies, Martha Nussbaum's capabilities approach deals
with the concerns about practical content and moral priority of human
rights, and provides a productive space for understanding their
implementation.
B.

The Capabilities Approach

Philosopher Martha Nussbaum advocates providing individuals with
the means to achieve full human potential, and enumerates a list of
"universal" capabilities that describe such flourishing. 123 Her scheme
119. See generally Karl E. Klare, Legal Theory and Democratic Reconstruction: Reflections on
1989,25 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 69,98 (1991).
120. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, in HuMAN
RIGHTS: CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS 31, 33 (Janusz Symonides ed., 2000).
121. See, e.g., Universal Deelaration, supra note 14, at art. 22 (limiting responsibility "in
accordance with the organization and resources of each State"); ICESCR, supra note 9, at art. 2, para. I
(States must undertake steps "to the maximum of its available resources"); CRC, supra note 24, at art.
4 ("States parties shall undertake such measures to the maximum extent of their available resources").
Thus, the caution expressed by the Independent Expert that allocation concerns should not be "used as
a pretext for avoiding action." U.N. Econ. & Soc. Couneil [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights,
Working Group on the Right to Dev., Study on the Current State of Progress in the Implementation of
the Rights to Development, at para. 29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.411999/WG.I8/2 (July 27, 1999) (prepared by
Arjun K. Sengupta).
122. See David Copp, Equality, Justice, and the Basic Needs, in NECESSARY GooDs: OuR
RESPONSIBILITIES TO MEET OTHERS' NEEDS 113, 113 (Gillian Broek ed., 1998) (noting that neither
egalitarian nor liberal theories regarding distribution of social goods adequately address issues of
prioritization).
123. As part of her continuing research agenda, Nussbaum has applied the capabilities approach to
women in a number of contexts. To date, the fullest enunciation of her theory, and the one I reference
most for the sake of convenience, is MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH (2000) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES
APPROACH].
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provides an elegant normative theory addressing human rights aspirations
and content. As currently comprised, however, Nussbaum's capabilities
approach excludes certain intellectually disabled individuals and treats
others as unequal participants by measuring abilities downward from a
standard of "species typicality. "I 24
1.

The Capabilities Approach as it Informs the Human Right to
Development

Articulated as a universal feminist political philosophy, Nussbaum's
version of the capabilities approach maintains that public political
arrangements must provide citizens with the means through which to
develop their full human potential as defined by ten central
capabilities: life-the faculty to live one's full lifespan; bodily healthhaving good health, including reproductive capability; bodily integrityfreedom of movement and bodily sovereignty; senses, imagination, and
thought-cognizing and expressing oneself in a "truly human" way;
emotions-loving, grieving and forming associations; practical reasoncritical reflection and conscience; affiliation-self-respect, empathy and
consideration for others; other species-being able to co-exist with other
species and the biosphere; play-the ability to enjoy recreation; and
control over one's political environment-via meaningful participationand material
surroundings-through property
ownership and
employment.I 25 While this catalog does not comprise a "complete theory of
justice," Nussbaum considers these functions essential because engaging in
them is a uniquely human, as opposed to animal or mechanical, mode of
existence. Put another way, Nussbaum maintains that her ten central
capabilities collectively define "the presence or absence of human life."I 26
Since each central capability is a separate component of this theory,
States must provide each at a threshold level to ensure basic human
functioning, and cannot provide for one component beyond the threshold
while denying or limiting another. Nussbaum concedes that some of the
central capabilities include what John Rawls called "natural goods," or
commodities occurring serendipitously, the existence and extent of which
States cannot always balance out (like attractive physical features). I27
Nonetheless, Nussbaum asserts that political principals can fulfill their
124. The notion originates with bioethicist Norman Daniels, who argues that a universal right to
health care must be circumscribed to instances of ensuring or revising the "normal species functioning"
necessary for individuals to arrive at the "normal opportunity range" of function within their respective
societies. See, e.g., NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 26-35 (1985); Norman Daniels, HealthCare Needs and Distributive Justice, I 0 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 146, 158-60 ( 1981 ).
125. NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES APPROACH, supra note 123, at 78.
126. !d. at 35, 72.
127. RAWLS, supra note 93, at 62.

100

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:75

obligations by leveling out the social bases underlying the distribution of
natural goods. Hence, while governments cannot guarantee the emotional
health of all women, they can create an environment conducive to ensuring
emotional health through suitable family law, rape prohibition and
prosecution, and public safety regulation. 128
Central capabilities are also "combined capabilities," which
Nussbaum defines as "internal capabilities combined with suitable external
conditions for the exercise of the function." 129 As an example, a physically
healthy woman who has the internal capability for sexual gratification may
nevertheless lack the combined capability to pursue her sexuality because
of repressive social constructs, whether religious, moral, or related to
reproductive health. 130 In such a case, the State has not met its obligations
to its citizenry because it has not provided an environment in which the
combined capability can be expressed.
The capabilities approach avers that all people are individually worthy
of regard, autonomy, and self-fulfillment. 131 Accordingly, Nussbaum
rejects the welfare metrics commonly applied in development studies, such
as per capita GNP and the general utility of wealth maximization. Instead,
she avers that personalized welfare accounts are more trenchant than those
derived from broad, anonymous proxies. 132 General economic growth
"does not by itself improve the situation with regard to literacy and health
care," nor does it adequately illuminate the circumstance of any particular
individual. 133 Nussbaum requires that each and every person be treated as an
end in herself, rather than as the instrument of or agency to the ends of
others.
The central goal of the capabilities approach is to provide individuals
with the means through which to develop themselves, regardless of whether
they elect to do so. 134 Through her political theory, Nussbaum seeks to endow
people with the agency to choose. 135 Because the functions set forth as central
128. NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES APPROACH, supra note 123, at 82.
129. !d. at 84-85 (emphasis in original).
130. !d. at 85.
131. Ultimately, this tenet is called the "principle of each person as end." !d. at 56 (emphasis
omitted).
132. This reasoning provides an additional argument against aggregate analysis of public good, for
an absence of political liberty could not conceivably "be made up for by tremendous economic
growth." !d. at 81.
133. !d. at 32-33.
134. Her list, is therefore, "a list of capabilities or opportunities for functioning, rather than of
actual functions" because it "protects spaces for people to pursue other functions that they value."
NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES APPROACH, supra note 123, at 74.
135. That people would choose not to achieve their own full potential raises a secondary concern,
namely that of preference deformation. This concept posits that circumstances exist in which people's
basic preferences (which they would recognize if unimpeded) are negatively influenced by external
social forces, such as traditional hierarchies or religious beliefs. Nussbaum's response, which draws on
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capabilities are intrinsically rooted in the human condition, they are arguably
universal in nature. She presumes them to be culturally sensitive because as
universal values they are not considered to impose external-sometimes
labeled foreign-moral imperatives on other nations. 136
Nussbaum's conclusion that central capabilities "have a very close
relationship to human rights" 137 is overly modest; the capabilities approach
relates the same objectives espoused in the human right to development.
Moreover, her capabilities scheme improves the human rights framework
by providing content to its otherwise abstract aspirations of protecting
autonomy, ensuring dignity, and developing personal capacity. Yet,
Nussbaum's capabilities approach falls short as a universal theory because
it either excludes or only indirectly includes certain individuals with
intellectual disabilities.
2.

The Capabilities Approach as Under-Inclusive of Some Intellectually
Disabled Persons

Despite the theory's cogency, disability rights advocates can take
issue with the capabilities approach for being under-inclusive on two
grounds. 138 First, the approach does not go far enough towards empowering
disabled persons with the "right to be in the world." 139 Historically, the
disabled have been among the most marginalized individuals, 140 and
predicating their social inclusion on notions of societal contribution will
not improve this status. Second, Nussbaum's scheme fails to recognize the
the work of scholars as diverse as Gary Becker, Richard Posner, Thomas Scanlon, and Amartya Sen, is
that her approach makes the possibility of central capabilities (which should be universally appealing)
available, but does not force the issue. !d. at 115-22.
136. Nussbaum acknowledges that "even if one defends theory as valuable for practice, it may still
be problematic to use concepts that originate in one culture to describe and assess realities in another."
/d. at 36. Conversely, she also notes the cultural arrogance of assuming that particular values originate
with particular countries, for example, assuming that sex equality is an American construct in the face
of counter-cultural examples that include India's passage of a sex-based equal rights amendment in
1951. !d. at 39. Of course, not everyone agrees with these propositions. For the views of two scholars
who decry, in varying degrees, the cultural invasiveness of human rights norms, see MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, HUMAN RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY (2001); WENDY BROWN, STATES OF
INJURY: PowER AND fREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY (1995).
137. NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES APPROACH, supra note 123, at 97.
138. Although I take issue with Nussbaum's position on capablities as far as individuals with
intellectual disabilities, 1 stress my admiration for and agreement with the majority of Nussbaum's
work and thank her for a willingness to discuss our different perspectives.
139. tenBroek, supra note 58, at 842. Jacobus tenBroek and Floyed Matson made this assertion in
the context of welfare benefits by arguing that meaningful social participation means not only caring
for those who are unable to work through the welfare system, but more importantly, assuring that
disabled persons are able engage in society at large. Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The
Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 809-10 (1966).
140. The point is borne out by reading the ADA's Legislative Findings section documenting
adverse conditions encountered by people with disabilities living in the United States, the world's
wealthiest nation. See 42 U.S.C § 12101 (2000).
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full dignity of those functioning below her ten central capabilities.
Consequently, this constructed minimum excludes certain persons with
intellectual disabilities from full participation in society.
A key ingredient missing from Nussbaum's model is an adequate
concept of "participatory justice," or the ability of disabled persons to have
meaningful contact with the population at large. 141 Undergirding this notion
is a prevailing normative assumption that in a just society everyone should
have the ability to interact with and take part in general culture. 142
Participatory justice parallels the social model's assertion that, but for the
existence of artificial barriers, people with disabilities would play an equal
part in society. It further asserts that a just society makes participation a
moral imperative. Thus, even if a State cannot financially provide for a full
range of human rights, it can still acknowledge a moral obligation to
impart them. 143 Accordingly, participatory justice underscores that human
rights seek the elimination of disability-related barriers to equal social
participation. 144
However, by assessing social participation via functionality,
Nussbaum's capabilities list limits participatory justice for intellectually
disabled persons by not sufficiently ameliorating the social invisibility and
exclusion they experience. Instead, her capabilities list erects barriers to
social participation similar to the practice of predicating human
141. Nussbaum's model is concerned about participatory justice as evidenced by the inclusion of
respect and non-humiliation as two key elements. For instance, Nussbaum asserts that Sescha, Eva
Kittay's severely disabled daughter, lives a more socially participatory life at a segregated facility than
she did in her parent's home. That may well be true, and so Secha has benefited. However, one can
interpret the capabilities approach to permit people with severe intellectual disabilities to live in group
homes that (unlike Sescha Kittay's) are also completely segregated from mainstream society so long as
the residents interact with their peers and carers in a respectful and non-humiliating manner. Nussbaum
would likely disagree with this wholly exclusionary situation, but it is one that can he interpreted from
the way her model is set out. See generally Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 217 (2004); Elizabeth S. Anderson, What is the Point ofEquality?, I09 ETHICS
287 ( 1999); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE ( 1990).
142. "[IJndividuals cannot flourish without their joining with other humans in some sort of
collective activities." Anita Silvers, People with Disabilities, in THE OxFORD HANDBOOK OF
PRACTICAL ETHICS 300, 318 (Hugh LaFollette ed., 2003).
143. A State can also consider what practices and capacities it values and then allocate some
(small) proportion of its restricted resources towards that end. Currently, Malawi is using this approach.
Correspondence from Minister June Ntabaz to Professor Michael Stein (December 21, 2004) (on file
with author). A cynical argument can also be made that developing nations eagerly press the United
Nations towards second-generation rights in order to obligate more developed nations to financially
assist their implementation.
144. This idea animates the Draft Articles. For example, the convention requires States parties to
"take effective and appropriate measures to enable persons with disabilities to live and to be fully
included as members of the community" and to be present in all aspects of mainstream society. See,
e.g., Draft Articles, supra note 42, at art. 19 ("States parties shall take effective and appropriate
measures to facilitate full enjoyment by persons with disabilities of this right and their full inclusion
and participation in the community.").
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development on economic viability. Conditioning human development on
economic viability rather than inherent dignity is a deeply troubling notion,
and one that Nussbaum has rigorously and justifiably criticized. 145 The
application to persons with disabilities is particularly disconcerting because
historically, mainstream society rationalized disabled persons' exclusion
on the assumptions that they were more expensive and contributed less to
society than non-disabled. 146 A stark statement of this perspective is that of
neo-Hobbesian philosopher David Gauthier. He utilizes this assertion to
justify ministering to the disabled in a lesser manner than to the elderly,
proclaiming that while the aged "have paid for their benefits by earlier
productive activity," one may speak only "euphemistically of enabling [the
disabled] to live productive lives, when the services required exceed any
possible products." 147 A more nuanced treatment of this theme is found in
the context of the ADA, where empirically unsubstantiated pleas for
efficiency supply an economically rational motivation for employers to
withhold accommodations from disabled workers. 148 Such economic
justification has led to regimes that systematically bar disabled people from
fulfilling their agency as citizens. 149 The many presumably wellintentioned yet paternalistic welfare systems that provide subsistence to

145. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of
Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 PoL. THEORY 202, 229 (1992) (dismissing the notion that
macroeconomics can accurately reflect the quality of life within a country because the "measure does
not even concern itself with the distribution of resources and thus can give good marks to a country
with enormous inequalities").
146. Nearly all Disability Studies commentators accord some influence (whether resulting in overt
or unconscious differential treatment) to the phenomenon of "existential anxiety." The term originates
with political scientist Harlan Hahn, who asserted that repugnance to disabled bodily difference,
combined with fear of also attaining such variation in the future, results in a sociological desire to
segregate people with disabilities from the mainstream. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical
Di.flerences: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. Soc. IssuEs 39,43-44 (1988); Harlan Hahn, Towards
a Politics ofDisability: Definitions, Disciplines, and Policies, 22 Soc. Sci. J. 87 (1985).
147. DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT 18 n.30 (1986).
148. The most thoughtful enunciation of this position is Mark Kelman, who distinguishes between
the societal norms that exist against "simple discrimination" and those norms which mandate the
provision of "accommodation." See Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 833 (2001); MARK KELMAN, STRATEGY OR PRINCIPLE?: THE CHOICE BETWEEN REGULATION
AND TAXATION (1999); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (practices that
unquestionably discriminate against disabled employees for economic reasons are constitutional
because "it would be entirely rational" for state employers "to conserve scarce financial resources by
hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities" rather than accede to ADA requests).
149. This is the thrust of the arguments made by historian Deborah Stone in arguing that "[t]he
very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected of the nondisabled-what
injuries, diseases, incapacities, and problems they will be expected to tolerate in their normal working
lives." DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 4 (1984).
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people with disabilities in lieu of workplace participation are emblematic
ofthis problem. 150
Second, by setting minimal standards, Nussbaum's list of central
capabilities fails to acknowledge the full humanity and equality of
individuals functioning below her idealized norm, especially those with
intellectual disabilities. Initially, Nussbaum wrote that society ought to
value individuals with intellectual disabilities on social justice grounds
unrelated to a capabilities approach. 151 She pointed out the parallels
between caring for the disabled and caring for the young or elderly, and
noted women's unequal role as caregivers in those contexts. 152
Correspondingly, she maintained that in contrast to the purely reciprocal
position embodied by social contract theory, social justice requires
enhancing women's capabilities so they can provide care to persons with
disabilities and others in need. 153 But Nussbaum left unaddressed the
explicit question of whether the capabilities model is applicable to those
with intellectual disabilities. On the one hand, inclusion of intellectually
disabled persons seemed implicit. The capabilities approach emphasizes
human dignity and values individuals as an end. On the other hand,
inclusion of intellectually disabled persons seemed implausible. Persons
with reduced cognitive ability to reason or perform other capabilities are
not embraced by criteria viewing these processes as indicative of being
"truly human." 154
In her latest book, Nussbaum attempts to resolve the problem of
including intellectually disabled persons in her capabilities approach. In
doing so she strikes a curious and undesirable compromise by excluding
some persons with intellectual disabilities from her framework and
including others only indirectly. 155 Because the capabilities list is "so
150. Theresia Degener states the case bluntly: "Persons with disabilities are regarded as being
incapable of living as autonomous individuals." Theresia Degener, Disability as a Subject of
International Human Rights Law and Comparative Discrimination Law, in DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL,
supra note II, at 151, 154. See also tenBroek & Matson, supra note 141, at 809-10 ("Throughout
history the physically handicapped have been regarded as incompetent to aid themselves and therefore
permanently dependent upon the charity of others .... ").
151. Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens,
30 PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS 133 (2002).
152. NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES APPROACH, supra note !23. for an extensive treatment of this
phenomenon, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000).
153. Some social science research supports the notion that caregivers ought to be given priority
when it comes to redistribution of resources. See, e.g., Avery Russell, Applied Ethics: A Strategy for
Fostering Professional Responsibility, 28 CARNEGIE Q. 1, 5 (I 980) (case study indicating that
individuals with vulnerable dependents ought to be preferred over others).
!54. NUSSBAUM, CAPABILITIES APPROACH, supra note 123, at 78.
155. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, SPECIES
MEMBERSHIP (2006) (hereinafter NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE!.
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normatively fundamental," she explains, only those individuals who come
close to attaining the enumerated functions live a "fully human life" that is
"worthy of human dignity." 156 Those who are unable to reach these bottom
lines, including some proportion of the intellectually disabled, are in
Nussbaum's view "extremely unfortunate" and exist at a level "beneath
which a decently dignified life for citizens is not available." 157 Thus,
although a just society generally mandates that people with intellectual
disabilities receive capabilities resources, 158 some will not; for some others,
society must channel funds "through a suitable arrangement of
guardianship." 159
With these assertions Nussbaum subtly alters her previous capabilities
approach, requiring a minimal level of function as a prerequisite to full
participation. Because certain intellectually disabled persons are without
the ability to achieve each of Nussbaum's bottom lines, even dignity and
justice cannot justify the direct allocation of resources for them to flourish.
Thus, while Nussbaum's capabilities framework can apply to povertyindeed, it derives from Amartya Sen's position on poverty alleviation-it
cannot apply to certain instances of intellectual disability. This is ironic for
three reasons. First, there is a strong factual and causal interrelationship
between poverty and disability. Second, while Nussbaum's capabilities
approach adheres to established norms of functionality, Sen's original
capabilities approach does not require a threshold to guide or justify
allocations to individuals with different needs. 160 Third, and consequently
more perplexing, Nussbaum's analysis falls prey to the same error she
identifies as plaguing social contract theory, (and especially Rawls)
namely, that social goods beneficiaries are required to provide adequate
contributions back to society to justify receiving equal distribution. 161

156. /d.at181.
157. !d. at 192, 179.
158. !d. at 98-100.
159. !d. at 193; see also id. at 195-211 (providing domestic and international examples of
guardianship that "maximize autonomy").
160. Distinguishing distribution of goods from the capability to use them, Sen rejects the use of a
resources or primary goods list as the sole basis of comparison. AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED 31, 38 (1992).
161. An explanatory note is warranted. Throughout her scholarship, and especially in FRONTIERS
OF JusTICE, Nussbaum takes great pains to rebut the position maintained by John Rawls and other
philosophers subscribing to social contract theory. Those commentators maintain that to justify the
distribution of primary goods, recipients must adequately contribute to society. In other words, the
prevailing philosophical belief she strongly rebuts is that resource distribution should be tied to an
individual's capacity to contribute to others. It is therefore odd that the idea of contribution has crept
into Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Yet by setting species typicality as the level of capability that is
the threshold for cutting off resource distribution, Nussbaum applies this determination both as a
descriptive and a normative qualification, and in so doing FRONTIERS OF JusTICE may be read as letting
this idea back in.
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Ensuring the dignity of disabled people requires an opposite approach.
It entails recognizing them for their intrinsic value as people and not as a
means towards other ends. This dignitary perspective compels societies to
acknowledge that persons with disabilities are valuable because of their
inherent human worth rather than their net marginal product. Such an
integrated human rights approach asks about the qualities of an individual
and how developing her talents can benefit both her and society. By
amending Nussbaum's scheme to treat these problems of under-inclusion,
it is possible to create a space within which to more fully understand the
content of human rights. The next Section discusses how the disability
human rights paradigm serves this goal.

C.

The Disability Human Rights Paradigm

Combining the best elements of the social model of disability, the
human right to development, and Nussbaum's capabilities approach, the
disability human rights paradigm provides a comprehensive framework for
ensuring the development of individual talent. Like the social model of
disability, the disability human rights framework stresses society's role in
constructing disability and its responsibility to rectify disability-based
exclusion. Like the human right to development, it urges the
interrelationship of first- and second-generation rights. And like the
capabilities approach, it states a moral imperative for societies to provide
resources for developing human potential. Its core modifications include a
focus on the cultivation of individual talents rather than Nussbaum's
minimum "universal" levels of functioning, and an emphasis on intrinsic

This is because Nussbaum's use of species typicality is both factual and normative. As
applied, it is not only the level of capability that humans typically enjoy, but also the threshold level
demanded for a life of human dignity. But why should the level of capability typical of the species also
be the level needed for achieving or preserving a dignified life? If this equation is intuitive, it probably
is because we associate species typical levels of capability as being valuable because they enable us to
care for ourselves and to be perceived as contributing to others. By contrast, lower than typical species
functioning is undignified and not truly human because those individuals are a burden to society.
Nussbaum frames her arguments in terms of choice, and values species typical levels of capability as an
important justification for allocating resources to bring everyone up to these levels. Her capability
approach is set forth in terms of agency, and Nussbaum believes that people need not exercise their
capabilities. In fact, however, social pressure to exercise capabilities and their associated functioning is
a familiar phenomenon. Consider, for example, the debate over cochlear implants. Once the
technological capability exists to enable deaf people to access aural communication, social pressure is
brought to bear on deaf individuals to use this technology rather than rely on sign-language interpreters
precisely because the species typical mode of communicating makes them better able to contribute
without being burdensome to others.
I thank Anita Silvers for pointing out the difficulties (possibly insurmountable) of invoking species
typicality as a standard without also inviting the stigmatization and exclusion of those who cannot be
brought up to the standard.
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human worth rather than contribution as the moral foundation for state
resource allocation.
The disability human rights framework focuses on allowing
individuals to achieve their specific talents, rather than focusing on a lack
of overall capabilities as measured against a functional baseline. Talents
are more specific to individuals than capabilities, and by definition are not
universally shared. Utilizing a disability framework allows society to
appreciate potential from the bottom up rather than from the top down
through developing people's talents to ensure their flourishing. A disability
human rights paradigm maintains that developing one's talents is at the
core of being human, and one must view talent as its own end rather than a
means to another end-such as achieving species-typical levels of
functioning for certain capabilities. The development of talent is a moral
imperative that all societies owe to each of their citizens, even if citizens'
relative talents are unequal. Thus, the disability human rights paradigm's
view of human life is not only about individual flourishing, but also about
dignity, autonomy, and individuality, and so necessitates a greater view of
all persons contributing to and participating in society. Moreover, the
capabilities approach bars distribution of resources that do not increase
agency to baseline levels in all ten categories. By contrast, the disability
paradigm focuses on the development of individual talent and permits
resource distribution to individuals whose agency can be increased in any
category. In doing so, the disability framework avoids the all-or-nothing
requirement of Nussbaum's capabilities approach, and permits greater
flexibility when States prioritize their resource allocation. 162
Considering some of Nussbaum's examples illustrating how the
capabilities approach applies to intellectually disabled persons helps
illustrate the inclusive difference between a disability human rights
paradigm and her framework. While arguing on social justice grounds for
the care of people with intellectual disabilities, Nussbaum describes the
lives of three intellectually disabled children. Philosopher Eva Feder
Kittay's daughter Sesha has cerebral palsy and is severely intellectually
disabled. Public intellectual Michael Berube's son Jamie has Down
syndrome. 163 Nussbaum's nephew, Arthur, has Asperger and Tourette
162. To illustrate: Nussbaum's capabilities approach does not provide resource distribution to
child prodigies or savants to enable either group to exceed a species typical norm by developing their
special talents. This is because resources to these individuals (assuming they were otherwise capable of
attaining the ten capabilities) would stop being distributed at the point that they achieved an average
human functioning level. By contrast, a disability human rights approach would provide resources for
the members of both groups who are impaired in some respects but gifted in others to exceed species
typical levels of the capabilities they can achieve, regardless of whether they could attain species
typicality in all ten capabilities.
163. NUSSBAUM, fRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 133-36.
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syndromes. 164 Each has a distinct personality and needs. Sesha loves pretty
dresses, dancing to music in her wheelchair, and returning her parents'
hugs. 165 Jamie is a fan of B.B. King, Bob Marley, and the Beatles, and has
a clever wit. 166 Arthur deeply understands the theory of relativity and other
scientific quandaries, and is politically savvy. 167
According to Nussbaum's central capabilities metric, these children
may not become sufficiently economically productive to repay society for
the resourees they use. 168 Sesha and Jamie are unlikely to achieve practical
reasoning capabilities. 169 Arthur has "few social skills" and "seems unable
to learn them.'mo Yet each child is endowed with a minimum level of at
least two of the ten central capabilities: emotions and play. 171 And each has
talents that can be developed and encouraged. Sesha expresses emotions
and affinity. 172 Jamie and Arthur are likely to be employed and exercise a
range of citizenship abilities. 173
However, because Sesha (in contrast to Jamie and Arthur) will not
achieve central capabilities even with greater resource distribution, and
because she needs the entire range of capabilities to live a "fully human
life" that is "worthy of human dignity," two possibilities arise according to
Nussbaum: "either we say that Sesha has a different form of life altogether,
or we say that she will never be able to have a flourishing human life,
despite our best efforts.'' 174 Since Sesha is not vegetative and displays
human qualities of affection and affinity, Nussbaum concludes that Sesha
is not a different form of life. With a "flourishing human life" also out of
the question, Nussbaum concludes that a just society would, if
scientifically possible, have genetically removed Sesha's disabilities. 175
Accordingly, Sesha is excluded from Nussbaum's capabilities approach
because she is deemed incapable of reaching the required functional levels.
Not surprisingly, Eva Kittay (as Sesha's mother) argues that persons
with intellectual disabilities ought to be respected for their intrinsic value

164. !d. at 97.
165. EVA FEDER KiTTAY, LoVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 166,
172, 154-55 (1999); NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 96, 134.
166. MICHAEL BERUBE, LIFE AS WE KNOW IT: A FATHER, A FAMILY, AND AN EXCEPTIONAL
CHILD 147, 155 (1996); NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 97, 133.
167. NusSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JusTICE, supra note 155, at 96-98. Distressed over the modality of
President Bush's 2000 election, Arthur insisted on referring to him as the "Resident." !d. at 170.
168. !d. at 128.
169. !d. at 94-96.
170. !d. at 96.
171. !d. at 96-98, 134.
172. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 96-98, 134.
173. !d. at 98-99, 128.
174. /d. at 181, 187.
175. !d. at 192-93.
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as human beings. 176 To conclude, as Nussbaum does, that "Sesha's life is ..
. unfortunate, in a way that the life of a contented chimpanzee is not
unfortunate," because her capabilities are tragically out of step with those
of most members of her species community, is itself out of step with the
notion that the flourishing of each individual is itself a moral imperative. 177
The disability human rights paradigm adopts Kittay's view on this
point. 178 The framework seeks to encourage the talents of all children
because their human dignity is equal to that of children without intellectual
disabilities-not because they are able to rise to an expected functional
level. 179 In taking this stance, the disability human rights framework
likewise rejects Nussbaum's position that Sesha, and people like her,
cannot live a "fully human life" or that those lives cannot be "decently
dignified" or "worthy of human dignity." 180
Returning to Nussbaum's other examples, her capabilities approach
would distribute resources to develop Jamie and Arthur's potential. She
sees the expense as justified, even if the resources required by each child
are much greater than those required by others, because everyone deserves
to be brought as close as possible to the standard level of functioning
shared by the majority of society. Thus, Nussbaum's capabilities approach
includes persons with intellectual disabilities who (unlike Sesha) are able

176. Kittay stresses, in the communitarian tradition, the nature of our interconnectedness with one
another and the value that connection creates regardless of the range of our capabilities. This is
because, in her view, severely disabled persons increase their friends' and families' agency for caring
and moral connection. KiTTAY, supra note 165. As stated by one feminist scholar, "a relational
conception of the self suggests that we come to know ourselves and others only in a network of
interactive relationships and that this shapes and is necessary for exercising self-determining
capabilities." CHRISTINE KOGGEL, PERSPECTIVES ON EQUALITY: CONSTRUCTING A RELATIONAL
APPROACH 127-28 (1998). Put another way, we all depend on one another, and develop in relation to
each other. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, I
YALE J. L. & FEM. 7, 12 (1989) ("[R]elatedness is not, as our [liberal] tradition teaches, the antithesis
of autonomy, but a literal precondition of autonomy, and interdependence a constant component of
autonomy.").
177. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 192.
178. As Belden Fields noted, "[h]uman potentialities are developed within a web of cultural,
economic, and social relationships that are both facilitating and constraining." A. BELDEN FIELDS,
RETHINKING HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 76-77 (2003). For ways that disability
theory can learn from both feminist and communitarian theory, see Carlos A. Ball, Looking for Theory
in all the Right Places: Feminist and Communitarian Elements of Disability Discrimination Law, 66
OHIO ST. L. J. I 05 (2005).
179. In this way, the gap in Nussbaum's capabilities theory dovetails with Norman Daniels's
perception of disability, namely, that those individuals with disabilities for whom redistribution of
health care resources would fail to help achieve a normal range of opportunity ought not to receive that
social wherewithal. See, e.g., Norman Daniels, Justice and Health Care, in HEALTH CARE ETHICS 290
(Donald VanDeVeer & Tom Regan eds., 1987) (maintaining that society ought to redistribute resources
in the form of health care to those disabled people whose receipt would enable their function).
180. One must also wonder who would care for Sesha under Nussbaum's capabilities approach if
Eva Kittay was not able to provide support.
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to achieve baseline functions. However, these individuals are included in
the capabilities seheme only by proxy through their respective guardians,
and do not directly receive resources. 181 Consequently, the capabilities
approach denies their individual autonomy.
In contrast to this surrogacy arrangement, the disability human rights
paradigm emphasizes the equal dignity of all persons, and acknowledges
their autonomy in directing their own development. Accordingly, some
individuals may require the provision of guardians or others to facilitate
effective use of state resources towards enabling their talents, but the initial
right to those resources is not contingent on intervening proxies. The
disability framework, therefore, continues to focus on personal dignity as a
key element in human rights discourse, whereas Nussbaum's approach
continues to use functional ability as a metric to justify distribution. That
is, the disability perspective closely echoes classic human rights theory in
asserting that full equality is an intrinsic good to which everyone is
entitled. 182
In addition to bringing the existing goals of human rights discourse
into view, the disability human rights paradigm can also refocus these
aspirations through an emphasis on individual need. The next Part explores
the potential of extending a disability paradigm to other human rights
frameworks, and discusses the subsequent implications.
IV
EXTENDING THE DISABILITY HUMAN RIGHTS PARADIGM

The disability human rights paradigm can be extended retrospectively
to groups already protected under United Nations instruments, as well as
prospectively to people not currently protected. Considering these
possibilities causes us to rethink the human rights agenda in different ways
and toward different ends.
A.

Retrospectively

Recent identity-specific human rights instruments integrate first- and
second-generation rights as a means of protecting targeted populations. 183
In practice, however, the holistic approach of the human right to
181.
182.

supra note 155, at 128-34.
For a general jurisprudential argument along much the same line, see LARRY S. TEMKIN,
INEQUALITY (1993 ).
183. The ICERD targets racial discrimination that has "the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life." ICERD, supra
note 22, at part I, art. I. The CRC, likewise combining first- and second-generation rights, recognizes
"that every child has the inherent right to life" and charges parties to "ensure to the maximum extent
possible the survival and development of the child." CRC, supra note 24, at art. 6, paras. 1-2.
NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE,
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development has not been effectively enforced, 184 and has been subjected
to criticism precisely because of its steadfast linkage of first- and secondgeneration rights. 185 The disability rights framework provides us with a
strong reminder of how important it is to transcend this divide rather than
ask what type of right has precedence for human rights. This is in large part
because the attitudes motivating disability-based exclusion frequently
manifest in the creation of a prohibitive environment. Ameliorating such
barriers underscores the notion that ensuring equality in any meaningful sense
requires not only the assertion of negative rights, but also the reconstruction
of our world through positive initiatives if we mean to value and include
every individual's participation. For the disability human rights paradigm,
neither type of right is more important than the other. The fact that each is
integral suggests international frameworks need to utilize and embrace
both equally. 186
The CEDA W offers a particularly clear example of a failed
application of the integrated human rights model. In order to advance the
concept of a State's obligation to establish equality between men and
women, the treaty calls for parties to eliminate all forms of discrimination
against women and "[t]o take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization or

184. Indeed, many NGOs consider the enforcement of economic, social, and cultural rights as
either pragmatically infeasible or beyond their basic mandates. Compare, e.g., ARYEH NEIER, TAKING
LIBERTIES: FOUR DECADES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR RIGHTS xxix-xxx (2003) (President of the Open
Society Institute asserts that economic, social, and cultural rights are not legitimate rights), with
Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic. Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues Faced by an
International Human Rights Organization. 26 HuM. RTs. Q. 63 (2004) (Executive Director of Human
Rights Watch explains that NGOs are most effective, and so concentrate, on using shaming methods
against clear first-generation rights violations), with Leonard S. Rubenstein, How International Human
Rights Organizations Can Advance Economic. Social. and Cultural Rights: A Response to Kenneth
Roth, 26 HuM. RTs. Q. 845 (2004) (Executive Director of Physicians for Human Rights points out that
NGOs need not choose one generation of right over another, but can seck justice in both instances by
collaborating with peer organizations), and Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights, supra note
I 03 (human rights doyen criticizes Amnesty International for representing its mandate as enforcing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but in reality only implementing parts ofthat treaty).
185. Recall the discussions, many centering on China, about how some nations prioritize either CP
or ESC at the expense of the other. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, NAFTA 's Investment
Chapter: Initial Thoughts About Second-Generation Rights, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1533, 153645 (2003) (discussing the fundamental differences between the two forms of rights in practice, and
Western nations' reluctance to provide ESC rights ordered in the ICESCR).
186. See HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (2d
ed. 1980). Alternatively, Shue sets forth three State obligations in relation to human rights: the duties to
respect, protect, and fulfill human rights. The first two may be thought of as requiring a State to refrain
from violating an individual's human rights and to protect that person from violations by non-State
actors. The third, however, mandates the State to proactively and positively provide the means by
which to achieve human rights.
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enterprise." 187 To transform women's role and place in society, the
CEDAW further mandates States parties modify behavior patterns arising
from stereotyped notions of either sex as inferior or superior. 188 As a hard
law treaty, the CEDA W is an ambitious attempt to rework the social
geography by interweaving first- and second-generation rights-attempting
to effect deep legal, social, and cultural transformation of women's role in
society. 189
Despite the CEDA W's structure, assertions of women's rights under
the convention often invoke only first-generation civil and political
rights. 190 By this limiting invocation, practitioners have fallen in step with
early-and now superseded-feminist scholars who eschewed gender
difference by arguing for equal treatment on the basis of sameness, rather
than essentializing the significance of difference to understanding women's
equality. 191 This tension between absolute notions of sameness and
difference in asserting equal treatment parallels the difference of opinion
between social model advocates and those seeking to incorporate secondgeneration rights into the disability discourse. Ironically, this type of
dichotomous perspective is exactly what the CEDA W attempts to forestall
by embracing notions of formal justice (as sameness) and redistributive
justice (as difference) thereby attempting to avoid the artificial divide
187. CEDA W, supra note 23, at 194, arts. 1-2. The CEDA W defines discrimination as any action
that impairs women's full and equal enjoyment of their human rights. CEDAW, supra note 23, at 194,
art. I. See generally Renee Holt, Women's Rights and International Law: The Struggle for Recognition
and Enforcement, I COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 117 (1991); NATALIE KAUFMAN HEVENER,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1983).
188. CEDAW, supra note 23, at 195, art. 5.
189. See, e.g., M. Christina Luera, No More Waiting For Revolution: Japan Should Take Positive

Action To Implement the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, 13 PAC. RIM L. & PoL'v J. 611, 615-16 (2004) (discussing the broad and ambitious goals of
the CEDA W in Japan).
190. Lisa A. Crooms, Indivisible Rights and Intersectional Identities or, "What do Women's
Human Rights Have to do With the Race Convention?", 40 How. L. J. 619, 627 (1997), discusses the
general conception of first-generation rights as privileged over second-generation rights, and applies
that concept to women's rights. This in tum has affected the practice of NGOs and other entities
monitoring human rights violations. See generally KATARINA TOMASEVSKI, DEVELOPMENT AID AND
HUMAN RIGHTS REVISITED 113-14 (1993) (explaining that human rights are thought to prevent states
from abusing people, while development is typically aimed at increasing economic growth and
satisfying basic needs). For a comparative analysis of how women's civil and political rights are
asserted, see Jessica Neuwirth, Inequality Before the Law: Holding States Accountable for Sex

Discriminatory Laws Under the Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against
Women and Through the Beijing Platform for Action, 18 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 19 (2005). However,
these complaints have not targeted the broader remedies that could be invoked under the CEDAW
provision requiring States to "modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct" that perpetuate
stereotypical gender roles. Laura Grenfell, The Participation of Afghan Women in the Reconstruction
Process, 12 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 22, 22-23 (2004).
191. The point is made by Tracy E. Higgins, Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights, 19
HARV. WOMEN'S. L. J. 89 (1996); ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF
EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988).
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between positive and negative rights. 192 This dynamic also goes against
contemporary feminist theory advocating transcendence of the samenessdifference debate. As one commentator astutely noted, "the CEDA W
framework, which embraces both universalism and particularism to some
degree, is probably the best and perhaps the only available legal strategy
for escaping [the difficulties of] rights-based essentialism." 193
Similarly, under a disability human rights paradigm the source and
type of equality-whether equal treatment or equal opportunity-is
irrelevant. However, because attitudes fomenting disability-related
exclusion manifest to a greater degree in critiquing an environment's social
construction, the framework provides an exemplar for why and how firstand second-generation rights applicable to women should be viewed and
implemented holistically.
In recognizing the interrelationship of first- and second-generation
rights, the disability human rights paradigm is not different in kind from
the human rights vision of other treaties, and in fact should be viewed as
kindred to the CEDAW. Accordingly, adding disability protections to the
existing human rights canon simply acknowledges the extent to which
"neutral" attitudes manifest in unnecessary and avoidable exclusion, and
makes clear the deep necessity of retrenching institutions and the social
situations they create and maintain. In so doing, the disability human rights
framework reaffirms a woman's fundamental right against discrimination,
and underscores a woman's right to a supportive landscape. However, the
disability dynamic also has the potential for responding to individual need
over group-based identity. This alternative, more ambitious implication
would create a dramatically different, although not mutually exclusive,
perspective on reconfiguring human rights.
B.

Prospectively

In theory, global provisions contained in hard laws such as the ICCPR
and the ICESCR protect all humans equally. 194 In reality, individuals not
currently specified under hard law treaties-for example, sexual minorities
and the poor-must fall under an additional protected identity criterion to
192. See generally Nicola Lacey, Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women, in GENDER
AND HUMAN RIGHTS 13,51 (Karen Knop ed., 2004); Hilary Charlesworth, Alienating Oscar? Feminist
Analysis of International Law, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW ]
(Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed., 1993).
193. LACEY, supra note 191, at 13, 51; Karen Engle, After the Collapse of the Public/Private
Distinction: Strategizing Women's Rights, in RECONCEIVING REALITY, supra note 192, at 143, I 55; see
also HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
FEMINIST ANALYSIS (2000).
194. See discussion supra Part I.A.; see also MICHAEL FREEMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 60 (2002) (defining civil rights as "deriv[ing] from the laws or customs
of particular societies," whereas human rights are those one has simply by virtue of being human).
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receive human rights recognition. The disability human rights paradigm
can solve this problem and bring both sexual minorities and the poor
within human rights protection. Protecting the rights of sexual minorities
advances the disability human rights framework's goal of eliminating the
notion that atypical people are of lesser worth. Granting poor people the
opportunity to develop human agency advances the paradigm's aspiration
of responding to individual need. Extending rights protection to these two
groups-and the individuals within--causes us to rethink the objectives
animating a human rights agenda. 195
One way to view human rights is to consider them existing along a
continuum that progressively extends towards marginalized groups. New
instruments are thus vehicles through which to remove mistaken
justifications for socially constructed exclusion. 196 Prior to addressing the
needs of disabled persons, the global community recognized the rights of
other excluded groups through enactment of identity-specific instruments
that went beyond the universal coverage of the lCCPR and the lCESCR.
Consequently, prejudicial social conventions directed at members of these
groups are now considered morally unacceptable and are legally
prohibited. 197 Disability-based human rights-reflected in both existing
soft Jaws and the evolving Draft Articles-are the most recent instruments
empowering a socially excluded group with human rights. 198

I 95. Jerry Mashaw has suggested that, when discussing disability-related policy choices,
foundational issues should be eschewed in favor of pragmatic and prudential considerations. See
generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 211, 221 (1994). I agree
that policy discourse ought to include concrete proposals, and so proffer a vision of what a disability
human rights paradigm would look like, but strongly disagree that "just" theorizing is inadequate. See
also Martha C. Nussbaum, Why Practice Needs Ethical Theory: Particularism, Principle, and Bad
Behavior, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
JR. 50 (Steven J. Burton ed., 2000) (asserting that philosophical theorizing is a necessary ingredient in
analyzing large systemic issues).
I 96. For parallels of this perspective within the race and sex civil rights categories, see Mary F.
Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L. J. 471,
489-90 (1990) (noting that "[s]ex stereotyping in the workplace is embedded in a complicated matrix of
interlocking beliefs" based on socially constructed definitions of "male" and "female"); see also
Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 133 I (1988) (noting the pervasive and racist nature of
seemingly neutral legal norms).
197. Adherents of behavioral economic scholarship would argue that a law's very existence, in
turn, shapes individual preferences by changing their taste for specific outcomes beyond the traditional
effect of sanctions through altering behavior. This ean be either because the new law carries a symbolic
social meaning, or because it affects the way individuals mediate that symbolie social meaning. For a
survey of the literature and an initial application of the theory to disability law, see Michael Ashley
Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of the ADA, 90 U. VA. L. REv.
1151,1181 (2004).
198. Interestingly, while disability is protected in the United States at the federal level, sexual
orientation is not. The opposite was true in Europe until Article Thirteen of the European Convention
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The theories underlying the disability human rights paradigm can be
used to extend protections to sexual minorities-most typically gays and
lesbians-subjected to pervasive and systemic discrimination in many
countries, if not worldwide. 199 At the same time, some commentators
acknowledge that sexual minonttes should receive negative rights
protection, but argue that they are an inappropriate target for secondgeneration rights. This is because, in their view, sexual minorities are not
necessarily economically worse off due to social exclusion. 200 This
proposition is empirically and normatively flawed. Empirically, it is highly
questionable that sexual minorities have not experienced monetary harm
through discriminatory experiences. Much like other minority group
members, sexual minorities do not invest in and develop their potential if
certain career paths or opportunities are deemed unattainable. 201 And
sexual minorities are not in a position to challenge exclusion from
was amended to include disability. M. A. Stein, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union, 62
CAM. L.J. 508, 508-09 (2003).
199. See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET (1999). Doing so, however, first requires acknowledging the socially contingent nature of
many cultural norms that are otherwise taken for granted as "natural" and "normal." As observed by
Robert Gordon: "[T]he power exerted by a legal regime consists [of] ... its capacity to persuade people
that the world described in its images and categories is the only attainable world in which a sane person
would want to live." Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv. 57, 109 (1984). See
also ALAN HYDE, BoDIES OF LAW 231 (1997) ("Law veils its own power ... by pretending to find
what it in fact makes itself."). These norms include, among others, heterosexuality, opposite sex
monogamy, and male-female human reproduction. See generally Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation
and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Arguments from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503
(1994). Each of these conditions has a strong counterfactual. Consider homosexuality, same sex unions,
and the increasingly prevalent use of scientifically assisted reproduction. As to the former, numerous
articles are published in the Journal of Homosexuality; as to the latter, see JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING
THE FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE (1997). Accepting one
version of social ordering over another is a matter of communal choice, not biological or logical
necessity. Understanding this elective as an elective paves the way forward for equal treatment of
sexual minorities. See generally Janet E. Halley, The Politics of The Closet: Towards Equal Protection
for Gay, Lesbian. and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915 ( 1989). Admittedly, some people do not
feel that sexual minorities are an appropriate group for either civil or human rights protection. This
sentiment has been borne out in reeent years in the United States, as demonstrated both by the defeat in
Congress of a bill which would have prohibited workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation.
See Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Civil Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING
CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 149 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 2000)
(describing the failure to pass the proposed federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act). This
sentiment is also demonstrated by the passage in eleven states during the 2004 election of same-sex
marriage ban referenda. See generally Carlos A. Ball, The Backlash Thesis and Same-Sex
Marriage: Learning from Brown v. Board of Education and its Aftermath, 14 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RTS. J. 1493 (2006).
200. This is also a dilemma that Nussbaum argues causes difficulty to Rawls's theory because his
allocation of primary goods is based on insufficiently nuanced distribution principles. See Nussbaum,
FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 178-84.
201. See generally M.V. LEE BADGETT, MONEY, MYTHS, AND CHANGE: THE ECONOMIC LIVES OF
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN (2001) (empirically debunking commonly held myths of homosexual
affluence).
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particular prospects if they do not first consider those options viable. 202
However, even if sexual minorities who are dissuaded from thriving in a
particular manner end up economically well off, they still suffer violations
to individual dignity and personal flourishing. This is particularly true if
they pursue social advancement by repressing elements of their
identities. 203 Extending disability human rights to sexual minorities
remedies this problem by addressing historical and group-based
subordination. 204
The disability-based framework also promises an alternative,
ambitious reconfiguring of human rights by moving from group-based
protection to individualized assessment. This shift is dramatically
illustrated by expanding rights protection to the poor, an idea advocated by
Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen.2°5 Because Sen avoids the language of
human rights-his assertions arise from development economics-!
attempt to add to his powerful assertions by framing them in terms of
rights. Thus the disability human rights paradigm acts as a bridge between
group-based rights discourse and Sen's progressive vision that responds to
individual need. 206
202. Like other self-fulfilling prophecies, this is a Catch-22: certain workers are disadvantaged in
the workplace because they are believed to have lower net productivity values. In turn, those workers
invest less in their own human capital because they believe that they will be disadvantaged in the
workplace. See David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) ("(S]tatistical
discrimination encourages minorities to underinvest in human capital, which in tum makes statistical
discrimination rational.").
203. Kenji Yoshino argues that sexual minorities assimilate in three different ways: converting,
(changing their underlying identity) passing, (retaining their underlying identity but masking it to
observers) and covering (retaining and disclosing their underlying identity, while allowing it to be
revealed to acute observers). Kenji Yoshino, Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769 (2002). For sociological
accounts of the effect that identity repression has on gay men, see llan H. Meyer, Minority Stress and
Mental Health in Gay Men, 3 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 38, 39-42 (1995), and JAMES D. WOODS &
JAY H. LUCAS, THE CORPORATE CLOSET: THE PROFESSIONAL LIVES OF GAY MEN IN AMERICA 74-75
(1993).
204. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REv. 245, 247-49 (1983); Paul
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I, 7-8 (1976).
205.
For representative examples of his enunciation, see AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS
FREEDOM (1999) (hereinafter SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM!; SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS CAPABILITY
EXPANSION, supra note 5, at 94. Briefly stated, Nussbaum's framework arises from Aristotelian
principles and is harmonious with much of what Sen argues, but also differs in several significant ways.
For an elaboration of these differences, see David A. Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The
Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic, 20 PoL. THEORY 584 (I 992); David A.
Crocker, Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic,
Part If. in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 153 (Martha C.
Nussbaum & Jonathan Glover eds., 1995).
206. Although I reframe matters of distributive justice in this Article using "rights talk," one could
also use the currency of "welfare," understood objectively rather than subjectively in terms of
preference satisfaction. I elect "rights talk" mainly for its strategic advantage. It is easier to enshrine a
normative principle in a legal document, like a treaty, while acknowledging that there might not be a
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Poverty arises from and is perpetuated by multidimensional factors
requiring systemic responses. 207 Beyond an obvious lack of wealth in the
material sense, being poor translates into diminished health, reduced access
to education and other basic social goods, marginalized participation in
political processes, and an overall diminished ability to develop personal
talent. 208 It is highly appropriate for the United Nations Millennium
development projects to focus on poverty alleviation, 209 for the annual
United Nations Development Reports to recognize poverty as a central
metric, 210 and for the World Bank to vow to focus on poverty alleviation in
addition to issuing loans to developing nations. 211 These international
bodies recognize that long term, effective responses to poverty are
inextricably linked to the enhancement of human rights. 212
In developing his thesis treating poverty alleviation as an
economic/political right, Sen argued that income deprivation is capability
deprivation; it deprives the poor access to essential goods and services. 213
In other words, redistributing wealth provides persons living in
impoverished conditions the means to achieve employment, education,

difference in result from utilizing other currencies. On the "choice of currency issue," see Richard J.
Arneson, Welfare Should be the Currency ofJustice, 30 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 497 (2000).
207. For a perspective by the Chair of the Millennium Development Goals, see JEFFREY D. SACHS,
THE END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME (2005).
208. "Poverty both affects, and is affected by, other human rights violations." Joe W. Pitts Ill, The
First U.N. Social Forum: History and Analysis, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. & PoL'v 297, 298 (2002); see
generally David Durman, The Dynamics of Poverty and Race in South Africa, 1994-1999. 9 GEO.
PUBLIC PoL'Y REv. 69, 70 (2003) ("Lack of access to health care, education, and employment
opportunities also increase a household's likelihood of poverty.").
209. Specifically, the United Nations aims to halve the proportion of people living in poverty or
hunger, as defined by earning less than one dollar a day, by 2015. See MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT
CoMPACT, supra note I 04.
210. See MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT COMPACT, supra note 104; U.N. DEY. PROGRAMME,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT I997, available at http://ww.undp.org.
211. See DEEPA NARA VAN ET AL., VOICES OF THE POOR: CRYING OUT FOR CHANGE 32 (2000)
(the World Bank's position "reinforces the case for making the well-being of those who are worse off
the touchstone for policy and practice").
212. See The Chairman-Rapporteur, Report of the Chairman-Rapporteur: The Social Forum, para.
50, delivered to the Economic and Social Council, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/18 (Aug. 9, 2002)
(explaining that the purpose of the U.N. Social Forum was to address the need "to give special voice to
new actors, including the poor and the marginalized and their organizations, which have no space
within the United Nations system"); Kaushik Basu, On the Goals of Development, in FRONTIERS OF
DEVELOPMENT EcONOMICS: THE FUTURE ON PERSPECTIVE 61, 65 (Gerald M. Meier & Joseph E.
Stiglitz eds., 2001) (stating that "in evaluating an economy's state or progress, we must focus primarily
on how the poorest people are faring").
213. These arguments are set forth in a chapter entitled "Poverty as Capability Deprivation." SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 205, at 87-110.
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health care, and gender equality. The essence of his argument is that
alleviating impoverishment is instrumental rather than intrinsic. 214
Sen then takes the capabilities approach further, arguing that poverty
differs from traditional group-based need in two ways. First, the effects of
poverty must be appraised and counteracted individually. Second, a greater
allocation of resources is needed for indigent people to reach an optimal
functional level than for other individuals. 215 While Nussbaum's
capabilities approach adheres to established norms of functionality, Sen's
original capabilities approach does not require a threshold to guide or
justify allocations to individuals with different needs. Rather, normative
expectations about the most effective application of resources should not
constrain the allocation of those resources to the poor. This latter assertion
is consistent with the broad social reconstruction Nussbaum is attempting
but does not achieve because of a flaw in the scope of her capabilities
framework. 216
Approaching poverty as a category for human rights protection would
signify a dramatic shift in which individuals are formally endowed with
identity-based rights. Established hard law treaties target particular groups
in an effort to ameliorate human rights violations experienced by
individuals within those categories. Extending human rights protections to
the poor is in contrast to this established trend by emphasizing the value of
individual identity over that of a group-based characteristic. In protecting
individuals regardless of historically targeted group status, this focus
removes the necessity of determining who is morally worthy of receiving
this benefit, itself a prudentially difficult and possibly unjustifiable
distinction. Such a shift also recognizes that opportunity involves a
spectrum rather than a bright line of abilities.
Refocusing human rights empowerment and resource redistribution
on the needs of particular individuals also helps accomplish three positive
goals. First, it eliminates prejudice in a different manner than is currently
perceived possible. This is because group identity norms by definition
equate with negative stereotypes; otherwise, there would not be a need to
eliminate civil or human rights violations. Raising individual identity and
need over group identity and need can therefore circumvent the
214. ld. At this point, one could plausibly argue that it is not any inherent limitation of disability,
female gender, or particular ethnicity that creates capability deprivation, but rather the correlation of
these characteristics with the means of accessing goods and services.
215. ld.
216. John Foster-Bey, Bridging Communities: Making the Link Between Regional Economies and
Local Community Development, 8 STAN. L. & PoL'Y R. 25, 27 (1997) (outlines the culture of poverty
thesis by stating: "[P]overty is not merely a function of lack of income, but also results from social
disorganization and unproductive behavioral traits that imbue low-income people with a sense of
inferiority, conditioning them to accept their status as unavoidable. These beliefs create a set of psychosocial barriers-a culture of poverty-that perpetuate poverty from generation to generation.").
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reinstantiation of negative stereotypes. 217 Second, it focuses on individual,
rather than group-based need, and thus can encourage the development of
individual capacity. This dynamic is in sync with the human rights
emphasis on protecting individual dignity and the capabilities approach's
emphasis on each person valued as an end. Moreover, as an empirical
matter, overlap is likely to exist between the categories, 218 including the
tremendous prevalence of poverty among people with disabilities, 219
women, and ethnic minorities. 220 Third, it requires that human rights be
integrated rather than fractured. 221 This is evidenced by its concentration on
individual need, which in tum reaches out to group-based need. For
example, note the absence of the word "disability" from each of the
respective United Nations Millennium projects relating to poverty, health,
and HIV status, though each is factually linked to disability. 222
Recalibrating the aim of the human rights discourse as a response to
individual need would develop the capacity of all individuals on the basis
of their inherent worth and potential. As such, disability-based rights

217. This point is made in the disability context by Anita Silvers, Double Consciousness, Triple
Difference: Disability, Race, Gender and the Politics of Recognition, in DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY
AND LEGAL CHANGE, supra note 78, at 75.
218. For a discussion of the interface between disability and gender at the international level, see
Theresia M. Degener, Disabled Women and International Human Rights, in 3 WoMEN AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 267 (Kelly D. Askin & Dorian M. Koenig eds., 2001). For a
broader discussion of the implications of double discrimination in this context, see the contributions in
GENDERING DISABILITY (Bonnie G. Smith & Beth Hutchison eds., 2004); WOMEN AND
DISABILITIES: THE DOUBLE HANDICAP (Mary Jo Deegan & Nancy A. Brooks eds., 1985).
219. According to the World Bank, one-fifth of the poorest individuals have a disability. See ANN
ELWAN, POVERTY AND DISABILITY: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE (The World Bank Social
Protection Paper No. 9932, 1999). See also tenBroek & Matson, supra note 141, at 809 (claiming that
"poverty and disability are historically so intermeshed as to be often indistinguishable"). See also
James D. Wolfensohn, Poor, Disabled and Shut Out, WASH. PosT, Dec. 3, 2002, at A25 (statement by
president of the World Bank that "research shows that disabled people are also more likely than other
people to live in grinding poverty").
220. Women, for example, constitute some 60% of the working poor, as reported by the U.N. Int'l
Research & Training Inst. for the Advancement of Women, Women and Poverty: New Challenges,
available at http://www.un-instraw .org/en/images/stories/Beijing/womenandpoverty .pdf (last visited
Oct. 6, 2006). Using health and education data as alternative indicators of women's poverty levels also
clearly indicates women's disadvantage relative to men in places such as South Asia, where "women
have only about half as many years of education as men and female enrollment rates at the secondary
level are only two-thirds the male rates." World Development Report 2000/2001, Attacking
Poverty: Opportunity, Empowerment, and Security 4, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/overview.pdf(last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
221. This point is demonstrated by the absence of disability as in the essays comprising DYING
FOR GROWTH: GLOBAL INEQUALITY AND THE HEALTH OF THE POOR (Jim Yong Kim et al. eds., 2000).
222. See sources and citations, supra note 107. By contrast, Christopher McCrudden correctly
argues that one of the most effective, albeit perplexing, methods for effectuating human rights is to
mainstream them into all levels of government decision making. Christopher McCrudden,
Mains/reaming Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE COMMUNITY: RIGHTS AS AGENTS FOR
CHANGE 9 (Colin Harvey ed., 2005).
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function as a capabilities-based bridge between established norms and
future aspirations attending to individual need and talent development.
CONCLUSION

This Article examines the theoretical implications of adding disability
protections to the existing canon of human rights, both for individuals with
disabilities and for other under-protected groups. It combines the best
elements of the social model of disability, the human right to development,
and Nussbaum's capabilities approach to proffer a disability human rights
paradigm that provides a comprehensive framework for ensuring the
development of individual talent. This Article maintains that Nussbaum's
capabilities approach provides an especially fertile space within which to
understand the content of human rights. Nonetheless, Nussbaum's scheme
falls short as a comprehensive framework because it excludes some
individuals with intellectual disabilities and does not fully include others.
Amending her approach to develop the talents of all individuals-even
those Nussbaum considers not "truly human"--creates a disability human
rights paradigm that comprehensively recognizes the dignity and worth of
every individual.
Because disability rights invoke civil and political rights as well as
economic, social, and cultural rights, the disability rights framework
presents a strong reaffirmation that established human rights protections
are similarly indivisible. Both types of rights are essential if hard laws are
to be effective. Hence, groups whose rights have historically been divided
between generational rights-such as women--could be strengthened by
the disability rights paradigm. Applying a disability framework
retrospectively to women reaffirms the need for a holistic approach to
human rights that can prohibit discrimination and rework social
landscapes. Moreover, utilizing a disability-based perspective could also
extend human rights to currently unprotected people, including sexual
minorities and the poor. Extending a disability human rights paradigm to
these groups empowers vulnerable populations in very different ways.
Sexual minorities have been excluded from social opportunities due to
prejudicial social convention. Their protection thus follows an established
and linear progression. The poor, however, do not possess immutable
group-based identity characteristics. Poverty alleviation as a human right is
a response to individual need and so raises a different set of human rights
issues. Each of these possibilities-retrospective and prospective
application of the disability rights paradigm to other groups-requires us to
reexamine the bases underlying existing notions of human rights
protection.
Finally, the assertions in this Article are unique. Instead of only
advocating disability-specific protection paralleling established human
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rights instruments, the Article also proffers an initial argument for
extending disability-based human rights concepts to other groups. In doing
so, this Article advocates for a dramatic shift in perspective by centering
disability within the analytical framework. Considering the ability of
disability-based notions to enrich the rights of already protected groups
rather than analyzing the ability of traditionally accepted norms to be
applied to the disabled is a dramatic change in rights discourse.
Historically, persons with disabilities have been among the most
politically marginalized, economically impoverished, and least visible
members of society. Many societies have viewed and continue to view this
social exclusion as natural, or even a warranted consequence of the
inherent inabilities of disabled persons. Adopting a disability human rights
model-and then extending it to other groups-repositions disability as a
universal and inclusive concept. As human beings, each of us has
strengths, weaknesses, abilities, and limitations. A disability human rights
framework prioritizes potential over function, and recognizes the value of
every individual for his or her own end. It assesses the efficacy of human
rights protection in light of exogenous factors that impact each person's
development. Doing so embraces disability as a universal human variation,
rather than as an aberration.

